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And as a result of centuries of war and migration, one nation's
historical claims can only be one layer of an archeology of
claims by separate nations for the same land, on which now live
populations mixed ethnically or with multiple national identities.'
INTRODUCTION
The Dayton Peace Agreement ("DPA," "Dayton Agreement," or
"Agreement") was signed as a means to bring to an end the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.2 In the Western guarantor states the agreement was
widely heralded as a triumph of diplomacy over chaos, a reasoned agree-
ment over crude warfare, and a multilateral agreement that forced
confirmation of the legal existence and viability of the Bosnian state by all
parties to the conflict. Despite the undeniable accomplishment of ending
mass fratricidal violence on Bosnian territory, the Agreement is a para-
dox of both substance and implementation. The DPA confirms the
existence of the state yet contains the ingredients that divide it into sepa-
rate political and legal entities. The treaty pays homage to the language
of self-reliance while ensuring that a long-term international presence
remains a necessary element for the survival of the state. The Dayton
Agreement fortifies the tripartite division of nation, community and in-
dividual in the new Bosnia where ethnic identity is all, and the body
politic is a fractured soul.
1. SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE
COLD WAR 204 (1995).
2. The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995 and was
witnessed by the Presidents or Prime Ministers of the United States, the Russian Federation,
the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and by the European Union
special negotiator. See U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (1995), 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter DPA].
For useful accounts of the background to the conflict, see generally MARK ALMOND,
EUROPE'S BACKYARD WAR: THE WAR IN THE BALKANS (1994); NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA:
A SHORT HISTORY (1994); BRANKA MAGAS, THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA: TRACING
THE BREAK-UP, 1980-92 (1993).
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The Dayton Agreement was negotiated in a purposefully created
hot-house environment at the secluded Wright Patterson Air Force Base
in Dayton, Ohio.' It was signed by the negotiating parties and a group of
guarantor states, who were prepared to endorse and materially support a
peace settlement for the Bosnian war, in Paris, on December 14, 1995.
The Dayton Agreement came after numerous failed diplomatic attempts
by Western mediators to secure an end to war.4 The DPA is a complex
package of inter-related texts augmented by Security Council resolu-
tions that establish the international forces and organs which support the
Agreement.5 The DPA is the core of the compact among the belligerent
parties.6 Its preamble acknowledges the need for a comprehensive set-
tlement among all factions.7 The text of the DPA makes broad
commitments to military arrangements among the parties,' demarcation
lines, 9 election programs,"' constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-
Herzegovina," and the establishment of new Commissions and Institu-
tions to support a peaceful transition and the observance of human
rights.2
In addition, the terse general text is supported by numerous detailed
Annexes which spell out in greater depth the parties' commitments. An-
nex 1A concerns itself with the military aspects of the Peace settlement,
including the cessation of hostilities, the redeployment of forces, and the
deployment of the Implementation Force ("IFOR").' 3 Annex 1B outlines
3. The DPA was initialed at Dayton on November 21, 1995. See generally, Dick A.
Leurdijk, The Dayton Agreement: A Tremendous Gamble, 3 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 2 (Dec.
1995-Jan. 1996).
4. These included the EC Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia ("Carrington"); the
UN/EC co-sponsored International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, August 26-27,
1992; and the Vance-Owen Plan (the Principle stages of the Vance/Owen Plan are set out in
UN Documents S/24795, Annex VII, 31 I.L.M. 1584 (1992)). It should be noted that the
argument may be made that the inclusion of Russia in the Contact Group, facilitated largely
by the United States, was a mechanism to avoid movement on "hard" issues. On one view the
inclusion of Russia appears to create a varied international presence and consensus on Bos-
nia, it also creates the indefinite inclusion of internal competing agendas in the management
of the conflict.
5. See U.N. Security Council Resolution 1021 of November 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 257
(1996); U.N. Security Council Resolution 1022 of November 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 259
(1996); U.N. Security Council Resolution 1026 of November 30, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 251
(1996).
6. See DPA, supra note 2, at 89.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 90.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Seeid.
13. See id. at 91-101.
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the measures dealing with regional stabilization, including confidence
and security measures, and regional arms control principles.14 Annex 2
establishes the inter-entity boundaries."5 Annex 3 is concerned with the
modalities of elections, guarantees for the protection of fundamental
rights, democratic structures, and inter-institutional relationships." An-
nex 4 contains the constitutional framework for Bosnia-Herzegovina.'
7
Annex 5 provides for the binding arbitration of disputes arising between
the Bosnian Federation and the Republika Srpska.8
Annex 6 devises the domestic institutional structures designed to
protect and enforce human rights in the post-war phase.'9 These struc-
tures include a Human Rights Commission, an Ombudsperson, and a
human rights judicial chamber. Annex 7 establishes the mechanisms
intended to facilitate the return and protection of refugees, including a
Commission for displaced persons and refugees. 20 Annexes 8-11 con-
cern themselves respectively with the preservation of National
Monuments, Public Corporations, Civilian Implementation and the
creation of an International Police Task Force.
The DPA is an agreement with inherent limitations. Yet, despite
these congenital defects, it is the sole framework that guides the new
Bosnia in its post-war phase. This essay examines the prognosis for one
element of Bosnia's institutional reconstruction: the Bosnian legal sys-
tem. This essay also illustrates the inherent problems of the DPA with
respect to legal institutions and culture in Bosnia. By understanding the
shortfalls of the international support structure and its domestic fledg-
lings, we may still have time to correct some of the deficiencies that
have been imposed or agreed upon since December 1995.
In this corrective process there should also lie some deeper
reflection. It leads me to deliberate on the wider issue of whether the
international community should require any minimal thresholds in its
facilitation of peace agreements among factious third parties. Is any
agreement acceptable as a means to end mass violence? Or rather, are
there minimal protections related to both the integrity of the individual
and state that are non-negotiable in such processes. An agreement born
out of the policies of ethnic cleansing and massive human rights
14. See id. at 108-11.
15. See id. at 111-13.
16. See id. at 114-25.
17. See id. at 125-30.
18. See id. at 130.
19. See id. at 130-34.
20. See id. at 136-41.
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violations must ensure that it is not a vehicle to facilitate the
continuation of the war by other means.
This essay also examines the substantial bilateral relationships be-
tween the domestic and international legal systems that have had
enormous effects on the perception and efficacy of the local legal order.
In particular, it charts the effect of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia on local legal culture and the potential for greater
liaison and support between local and international legal entities. This
essay also notes the extent to which overlapping and confused mandates
by a myriad of international organizations, many of which exercise legal
functions, have been unresponsive to or dismissive of localized capacity.
A. Restoring Legality-Some Principles
In the process of reviving Bosnian civil society, an indispensable
element is the capacity and strength of the Bosnian legal system to re-
generate and revitalize. Equally, regeneration on any level in Bosnia
requires tackling some hard issues from the outset. Each institutional
structure is a part of the larger conflict of whether this state can be re-
born as an ethnically mixed and inter-mixed one, or whether it will
continue to perpetuate a fight over nation within territory.
Justice systems are among those institutions which suffer most
during violent conflicts.2' In a state born out of the breakdown of law
and legality, law frequently has little currency for either political leader-
ship or the general populace. The descent to conflict is a rejection of law
and legality in its most crude form. Rehabilitation of the legal system is
not only about rebuilding courthouses and appointing unbiased court
officials to interpret the reinvented rules. The rehabilitation process is
far more fundamental than that. It requires no less than re-establishing
the legitimacy of law itself.
I begin this discussion from the departure point of three principles
which I use to inform the discussion of the interrelationship between the
national and international in the reconstruction of a failed state entity: in
this case, the Bosnian legal system. The first of these principles is inter-
dependence. The Bosnian legal system, as with most other aspects of
life in a shattered state entity, is not and cannot expect to be independent
for some considerable period of time. In its post-Dayton guise the legal
system is not only dependent on, it is also a construction of, the interna-
tional community. The international community is the guarantor and
21. See generally BASSIOUNI ET AL., GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR COMBATING IMPUNITY
FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (on file with author).
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chief architect of the shape and structure of Bosnia as it exists today.
This is a relationship of responsibility, notwithstanding domestic politi-
cal rhetoric in endorsing states, which seeks to undermine this
obligation by advocating unilateral withdrawal of international support
pillars be they military, civilian, or financial in character. In as much as
the Bosnian legal system is a situation of dependency on the interna-
tional community, so too is the latter reliant on a strong and functioning
system of Bosnian law. No withdrawal or long-term solution to the po-
litical crises that have beset Bosnia can be envisaged without a legal
structure to ease the way out for the international community. Depend-
ency is a bilateral, symbiotic relationship.
The second principle is accountability. Just as it is paramount that
restructuring take place, it must take place in an environment of open-
ness and trust, both from the international community and from the
insider Bosnian communities. Accountability reflects dual duties of the
receiving state and the facilitators of reconstruction. Some have argued
that accountability is achieved through "the requirement that a govern-
ment's continuation in office depends on the active approval of the
people as expressed in competitive elections. 22 As this essay will ex-
plore in greater depth later, periodic elections in a society fraught by
multiethnic tensions and competing nationalisms is neither sufficient to
protect accountability nor even democracy itself. A wider vision of ac-
countability includes respect for the rule of law and individual rights,
popular participation, pluralism, fair competition, and market develop-
ment." Accountability requirements also apply to states facilitating
reconstruction with military and economic aid. Accountability means
not only the translucence of financial investments, but also the transpar-
ency of agendas and full knowledge as to expectations and intentions on
both sides.
The third principle is that of respect. Restructuring is not another
form of neo-colonialism in legal guise. The international community has
taken over the functions of the state in various ways (albeit with the
rhetoric of temporariness). They are conflict mediators, police forces,
rule makers, standard bearers, watch dogs, and charity organizations.
This must not impede or stifle the capacity of internal political commu-
nities to rebuild institutional capacity. In this view, real assistance to
22. REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE CARTER CENTER OF AFRICAN
GOVERNANCE, WORKING PAPERS FROM THE SECOND ANNUAL SEMINAR OF THE AFRICAN
GOVERNANCE PROGRAM (Atlanta, Carter Centre, 1990) at 202.
23. See David Williams & Tom Young, Governance, the World Bank and Liberal The-
ory, XLII POL. STUD. 84, 85 (1994).
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persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina means developing the capacity to solve
problems for themselves. It means assisting and not hindering. To find
lasting, stable solutions to the Bosnian crisis, outsiders have to think
about really supporting the development of institutions and a political
climate that would enable people to generate solutions. This is meaning-
ful localization and not lip-service to subsidiarity. Such a simple
principle stands in notable contradiction to much of the philosophy be-
hind institution-building and democratization efforts undertaken by
many Western states in recent years. At the root of these efforts has been
the concept of institutional modeling. ' The underlying idea being that if
each major socio-political institution could become like counterpart in-
stitutions in Western democracies, the society as a whole would
transform. This model has a tendency to overlook existing domestic
structures that function adequately in the rush to import foreign exports.
This model suffers from the defect that its institutional components,
presumed universalistic, have country-specific, often American features.
In short, institution-building programs are blithely unaware of the vari-
ety of political and legal forms that democracy and rule of law come
in. Respect means that the mass importation of other legal systems'
structures and principles must be avoided, and that due consideration be
given to the validity of cultural legal pedigree of the jurisdiction.
B. The Responsibility of the International Intervener
Some argue that the DPA was the "best" deal that could be made in
the particular circumstances of its birth. The realities of an ongoing
armed conflict, the political marginalization of a number of key nego-
tiators, the limited patience of the contact states, and the fragile
consensus among them would inevitably hamstring any outcome. While
all these empirical assessments are true, they are an overstatement of the
limitations on the process.
It is easily conceded that the major task confronting the Western pow-
ers who convened the Dayton conference was the ending of violence. This
24. See Thomas Carothers, Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy 4
DEMOCRATIZATION 109,116 (1997).
25. As Carothers points out:
Consciously or unconsciously, many Americans have a tendency to confuse the
particular forms of American democracy with the basic idea of democracy itself,
either out of the hubristic belief that America is the most democratic country in the
world or out of ignorance about the forms of political life in other democratic
countries.. The United States is scarcely the only donor country that bases it
[sic] democracy assistance programming on country specific models.
Id. at 121.
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was the primary goal and a goal of immense rhetorical power. The
Bosnian war was unique in modem terms, as a slow genocide was visu-
alized for worldwide television audiences on a nightly basis. Thus,
ending violence had a significance not only for civilians and combatants
directly concerned with hostilities, but also for a wider, watching public.
The effect of this was clearly and correctly to focus attention on ending
armed conflict. However, the danger of this concentration was that the
ending of violence in itself was the goal, rather than addressing the
causal roots of conflict or the creation of meaningful structures that
would prevent its recurrence.
Getting the balance right in such situations is difficult for the states
facilitating resolution. There was no possibility that clashing communi-
ties in the midst of ongoing destruction were interested in or able to
create common norms or institutions from the "bottom up." Indigenous
solutions are impossible to cultivate when mass killings and expulsions
continue. However, a heavier burden is placed on the interveners and
facilitators. Peacemaking comes with obligations." While a worthy en-
deavor, facilitating the transition from armed conflict to co-existence is
not the end in itself. The intervener is judged on whether the facilitated
transition to co-existence is a durable one. Intervention is judged
equally on the rhetoric used by the facilitating states in creating the
process and its outcome." To compromise on setting high standards of
accountability for intervening states is to settle for a position that failed
or weakened states and their citizenry are entitled to a lesser version of
statehood because the components of state are being created by interna-
tional mediation.
When facilitating states are prepared to set low thresholds of con-
flict resolution from the outset, weak settlements are made.2 The
26. In 1992, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali set out his view of the mo-
dalities and categories of peacekeeping and peacemaking. The document is an early
acknowledgement that peacemaking carries with it additional responsibilities hitherto unac-
knowledged in traditional peacekeeping situations. See generally BOUTROs BOUTRos-GHALI,
AN AGENDA FOR PEACE (1992).
27. See Zoran Pajic, A Critical Appraisal of Human Rights Provisions of the Dayton
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 125 (1998). Pajic argues:
It is only too easy to concede that the Dayton Agreement was driven by the com-
promise that had to reflect the realities of four long years of war, ethnic
homogenization, and the mapping of ethnically defined territories in the region.
The diplomatic achievement of this compromise should not be underestimated, but
its compatibility with the universal demand for the protection of individual human
rights and freedoms must be tested.
Id. at 135.
28. Zoran Pajic is strongly critical of the Dayton Agreement on the basis that it sends
the wrong message to those who engage in genocide as a means to acquire territory. Pajic
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contact states and the fault lines between them, which characterized the
management of the Bosnian conflict, are squarely at the root of a com-
promise on Bosnia that is flimsy on procedure and substance. The result
is a weakened and compromised state, the very opposite of the stated
rationale for negotiation. This resort to placing responsibility firmly on
the shoulders of the international community may seem simplistic;
finding an easy scapegoat for a complicated problem. Nonetheless, I
would assert vigorously that negotiated settlements facilitated and
prompted by the international community remain its responsibility, as
much as they do that of the representatives at the table. By setting the
agenda of facilitation the international sponsors also prophesy the out-
comes that emerge. There should be no illusions about weak settlements
solving complex problems. The opposite is true. The Dayton Agreement
leaves open wide fissures that the international community has little
choice but to constantly renegotiate, making detachment from Bosnia
impossible in the short or medium term.29
What then is the choice in the Bosnian context? Renegotiation of the
peace agreement is both unlikely and undesirable in the short term. Eth-
nically driven internal politics might view a reopening of negotiations as
a means to limit positive and conciliatory commitments already made,
rather than as a step towards deconstructing the ethnic monolith. How-
ever, as this essay shall illustrate, to view the Dayton Agreement as
fixed, is to eschew the possibility of recreating Bosnia as an ethnically
mixed, multinational state. Thus, I propose a middle position. That is,
that the international community, which has much of the day-to-day re-
sponsibility for Bosnian societal activity, needs to view and execute the
DPA as a transitionary structure, whose primary advantage has been to
argues, "the Dayton Agreement sends the wrong message to warlords worldwide by implic-
itly legitimizing the gains of sectarian violence that often amount to the commission of war
crimes and crimes against humanity." Pajic, supra note 27, at 126. One could argue that a
weak settlement is evidenced by two factors. First, the physical reality that the inter-entity
boundaries conform to the frontlines carved out along ethnic cleansing during the war. Sec-
ond, the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina is constructed on the basis of the polices of forced
expulsions and displacement of persons during the war, based on their ethnic identity. See
Francis A. Boyle, Negating Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTs. Q. 515
(1996).
29. The issue of detachment is most acutely raised in the context of peacekeeping forces
and their continued presence in Bosnia. The U.N. began its peacekeeping presence with
Security Council Resolution 743 of February 21, 1992, when the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) was mandated to deploy in areas of Croatia. The U.N. became formally
involved in peacekeeping for Bosnia on July 13, 1992 by Security Council Resolution 764.
For a critical appraisal of this early peacekeeping policy, see Michael N. Barnett, The Politics
of Indifference at the United Nations and Genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia, in THIS TIME WE
KNEW: WESTERN RESPONSES TO GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA 128 (T. Cushman & S. Mestrovic
eds., 1996).
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create a stable and secure environment. Thus, by encouraging civil soci-
ety and emphasizing to the ethnic elites that ethnic hegemony and
partisanship is only an intermediate stage, guarantor states may create a
climate in which alternative structures are encouraged and fostered.'o By
fortifying the DPA's divisive structures, the alternative message from the
international guarantors emboldens those whose stock rises in the di-
vided, ethnically purified entities that currently comprise the nation of
Bosnia.
C. The Challenges to Rebuilding
The Bosnian legal system is the direct descendant of the legal sys-
tem of the former Yugoslavia." Each one of the successor states to the
former Yugoslavia did not instantly create new legal systems and insti-
30. A practical example of fostering alternative structures can be seen in the existing
electoral process and in the possibilities that exist to reform it for the international commu-
nity. As the International Crisis Group has pointed out, "The fundamental flaw in the existing
electoral system is that candidates need only to seek votes from one ethnic group to win
office and the consequences is a vicious cycle of fear and insecurity." INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP, BEYOND BALLOT BoxEs: MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ii
(1997) [hereinafter ICG]. All electoral processes in Bosnia are facilitated, funded, and over-
seen by the international community in various guises. Thus, the OSCE Supervisory bodies
include the Provisional Election Commission, the Election Appeals Sub-Commission, and
the Media Experts Commission. Additional bodies with international appointees include the
Citizenship Verification Sub-Commission and the Future Municipality Sub-Commission.
Finally, during September 1996 and September 1997, municipal elections the OSCE Office
of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights set up an Election Observation Mission, which
brought in hundreds of external short-term observers plus a core team of ten to twenty-five
observers to evaluate the entire election process. See ICG, supra, at 7; see also DPA, supra
note 2, at 114-125; Daniel J. Blessington, From Dayton to Sarajevo: Enforcing Election
Laws in Post War Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 553 (1998). This mas-
sive effort to ensure a working electoral process tells us that the international community is
not without resources and a capacity to encourage structural changes to an electoral system
which may inadvertently provide pseudo-democratic legitimization of extreme nationalistic
power structures. The ICG has advocated the following:
It is possible, however, to design an electoral system which would generate very
different results and help restore trust between the peoples of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. If, for example, candidates were obliged to seek support from voters of
other ethnic backgrounds in addition to their own in order to be elected, the politi-
cal equation would be transformed. Critically, a Bosniac could only in practice be
elected if acceptable to Croats and Bosniacs, and a Croat could only be elected if
acceptable to Bosniacs and Serbs. This may be achieved in many ways. One is to
set the ethnic proportion of legislative bodies to be elected in advance, that is the
number of Bosniacs, Serbs, Croats and Others to be elected, and then let all Bosni-
ans vote for representativeness of all groups.
ICG, supra, at 22.
31. As Bosnia has not been able to draft new legislation since independence in 1992, the
applicable law is still largely the legal codes of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which continues to bind its successor states.
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tutions. The outward forms and the symbols in the courtroom may have
changed, but this is fundamentally the legal system of a socialist state
with both a legal pedigree worthy of recognition and a notable number
of built-in problems which need to be addressed. 2 Further, while the
new constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina guarantees the democratic
minimals of multiparty elections, free elections, and an open media,
there is no reservoir of tradition to support a transition to their normali-
zation as part of ordinary political currency.
While there are admirable criticisms to be made of the pre-existing
legal and political order in Yugoslavia, what should not escape notice
for the purposes of this discussion is the extent to which the pre-war
system sustained a complex web of constitutional checks and balances.
In short, identity was central to political structures, but identity and ter-
ritory were not crudely matched pairs in the prewar constitutional
arrangements. While it is also true that not all identities were equal, Al-
banians being the case in point,33 the exceptions should not detract
attention entirely from an ordered constitutional structure that sought to
create a balance between group identity and national cohesion. The
founding peoples of Yugoslavia were Croats, Macedonians, Montene-
grans, Serbs, and Slovenes, with Muslims being added after the 1963
constitution. Susan Woodward describes the arrangement as follows:
"The six republics of the federation recognized nations as historical-
territorial communities. Individual members of the six constituent na-
tions (not fully coincident with the territorial boundaries of the
republics) had rights as members of those nations as ethnic peoples
(defined by a common religion, language, and political conscious-
ness)." '
32. As Hansen points out: "Neither of the successor states has traditions of multiparty
democracy, free elections and independent media as laid out in the new Bosnian Constitu-
tion. In addition, there is a deep mistrust towards security forces, the police and the judicial
system." Annika S. Hansen, Political Legitimacy, Confidence-building and the Dayton Peace
Agreement, 4 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 74, 75 (1997).
33. The situation of Kosovo highlights all the deficiencies of the pre-existing constitu-
tional structure of the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo is populated by a large majority of ethnic
Albanian Muslims, seeking the right to self-determination, and posited against a dominant
Serbian political culture that views Kosovo as the cradle of their civilization. For recent
views on the upsurge of political activity on Kosovo, see generally Jonathan Clarke, Don't
Encourage Separatist Aims of Kosovo Albanians, INT'L HERALD & TRIB., Jan. 12, 1998, at
A4. See generally David L. Phillips, Comprehensive Peace in the Balkans: The Kosovo
Question, 18 HuM. RTs. Q. 821 (1996); Rod Usher, Kosovo's Crisis, TIME, May 4, 1998, at
18-19; Massimo Calabresi, Kosovo Smolders, TIME, May 11, 1998, at 36; Anna Husarska,
It's Too Late for a "Preventative Deployment" in Kosovo, INT'L HERALD & TRIm., June 14,
1998, at 36.
34. Woodward, supra note 1, at 31.
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The DPA and its current epilogues makes no attempt at either so-
phistication or intricacy. The territory/identity pair has been forged and
its limitations are being clearly seen. The Bosnia that came into being
after the Dayton Agreement was the effective consolidation of division.
Within the guise of unity was the de facto partition of the country
among communities to form more homogenous ethnic zones." The in-
compatibility of this duality with basic democratic principles illustrates
the wide chasms of visioning for Bosnia's future stability.
In the pre-war context the privileged ethnic groups were regarded
not as minorities but as "constituent people." There is a vast difference
between both concepts. A constituent people is equal in status with all
other "peoples." Its rights are not the product of majority charity but an
entitlement on the basis of parity. No doubt, it can be said that the ter-
minology of "constituent people" gave rise to the language of self-
determination and secession. While I acknowledge that this link was
made as a political matter, one does not necessarily lead to the other.
But, it means without any doubt that to move from the status of a
"constituent" people to that of a minority is a demotion and was collec-
tively understood as such in the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation. In
the DPA framework, the protection of "entities" has hidden this demo-
tion quite strategically. The DPA does not address the problem of
accommodating peoples accustomed to formal legal equality as a con-
stitutional matter. It simply papers over the problem by entrenching the
segregation of those same peoples. Yet, this problem is not solved. This
is because the international community also continues to insist rhetori-
cally that Bosnia and Herzegovina must be rebuilt as an ethnically
integrated state. Should that rhetoric move to practical action, internal
and external actors will be faced with the conundrum that moving peo-
ples towards integration requires a confrontation with their group
35. See Sophie Albert, The Return of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Peace-
building with People, 4 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 1 (1997). Albert argues that the DPA was a
compromise between two views of the causality of the war. The first thesis depicts the war in
Bosnia as a war of aggression, in the context of the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation,
motivated by Serb leadership, strengthened by nationalist propaganda. Id. at 3. The second
thesis views the conflict as internal ethnic conflict. In this viewpoint the war can be summa-
rized as "a struggle between the creation of Bosnian nation grounded on a non-ethnic
political citizenship on the one hand, and on the other the creation of political communities
grounded on ethnic identity with ethnic borders which could secede." Id. at 3. Albert insists
that the international community fluctuated between these positions, and that the tensions
between them are also inherent in the Dayton Agreement. She says: "Dayton did not comply
with the Commission's [Badinter] legalist ruling about the concept of self-determination.
This has become the pretext to divide the country into two self-determined entities, whilst at
the same time, providing a facade of unity and integrity for the state of Bosnia and Herze-
govina." Id. at 4.
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status. 36 As yet, the international community has not learned the histori-
cal lesson from the former Yugoslavia that there must be a half-way
house between complete apartheid and integration on the basis of de-
motion in status for one group. This half-way house is the unknown
recipe for stability and meaningful equality in a multi-ethnic state.
D. The Constitutional Conundrum
Deeply implicit in the Dayton Agreement is the overarching goal of
the guarantor states to germinate democratic roots in the ashes of the
successor states to the former Yugoslavia. At least, that is the theory.
Elections, constitutions, constitutional courts, human rights protections,
and due process mechanisms play a rhetorical and public role in the po-
litical transformation that has been wrought by Dayton. The war is over,
and peace is brought by the carriage of democracy. Less overtly exam-
ined is the question of what form of democracy has been exported to
Bosnia, a minimalist or maximalist version? Arend Lijphart has made
strong claims that the form of democratic structure most appropriate for
a deeply divided society is that of "consociationalism."37 In this way of
thinking majoritarian structures undermine the project of remolding
culturally fragmented societies. Consociational or consensus democracy
requires a number of a priori schematic commitments: first, grand coa-
litions; second, stabilizing elite behavior38 ; third, segmental autonomy;
36. In some ways this problem is already being encountered in the attempts to reinte-
grate refugees into their former communities. As Albert points out, the testing ground for
integration and re-creating multi-ethnicity lies with returning refugees. She notes:
By returning, people have been expected to rebuild the multiethnic composition of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. But in that matter the Peace Agreement is ambiguous
and inconsistent. It does not provide sufficient safeguards in terms of institutions,
guarantees for the re-possession of property and homes for those who have been
evicted, or freedom of movement and security for returnees if they are returning to
an entity where another ethnie is in a dominant position.
Id. at 1. For Albert, it is the vulnerable refugee population which is being used as the tool to
create an ethnically homogenous nations in a fragile, multinational state. They are the bodies
expected to erase the consequences of ethnic cleansing and contribute to the rebirth of multi-
ethnicity. For recent evidence of failure of that political goal, see Chris Hedges, Fearful
Serbs Fleeing Last Enclave in Croatia, INT'L HERALD & TRIB., Dec. 18, 1997, at A4. See
also R. Jeffrey Smith, Legal Ethnic Cleansing Keeps Sarajevo Muslim, INT'L HERALD &
TRiB., Feb. 3, 1998, at A4.
37. Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, XXI WORLD POL. 207 (1969); see e.g.,
AREND LUPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION
(1977); Arend Lijphart, Democratic Political Systems Types, Cases, Causes, and Conse-
quences 1 J. THEORETICAL POL. 33 (1989).
38. For Lijphart, the behavior of elites is crucial to creating a stable democracy in a
highly plural society. Citing Claude Ake, Lijphart argues that as a result of overarching co-
operation between elites, a divided society can "achieve a degree of political stability quite
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fourth, proportionality; and finally, mutual veto. While some of these
elements are present in the political legacy of the Dayton Agreement,
many are missing. Elite political behavior remains combative, continu-
ing to aggravate mutual tensions and political instability. 9 Political
cooperation is markedly absent in the common institutions, and exten-
sive governmental coalitions are not on the horizon.4 This leads to a
more fundamental question: whether in fact, the form of.democracy en-
visaged by Dayton can be properly termed "democracy" at all, or is
more aptly characterized as a form of liberalization with. some demo-
cratic coating?4' This is a highly significant question. If the Dayton
Agreement was content to set and endorse low democratic thresholds,
arguably such schema will serve to reinforce ethnic political partition,
rather than to encourage an inclusive political spectrum. If we view the
DPA as the commodity of intensely divided political elites, determined
to maintain internal political hegemony in the physical space accorded
out of proportion to its social homogeneity." See Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, supra
note 37, at 212. The lack of will by political elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina to stabilize the
system by acting as a cartel of elites in cohort rather than in conflict, points to the limitation
of democratic roots inherent in the existing political structures. Hansen points out, "The
political leadership has shown little will to cooperate productively and governing institutions
are either non-existent, ineffective or corrupt, and seriously undermine all efforts to develop
people's confidence in peace." See Hansen, supra note 32, at 77.
39. See e.g., Smith, supra note 36, at A4.
40. Under the Dayton agreement, the legislative function is performed by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly. In both chambers, the House of Peoples and the House of Representa-
tives, power is distributed in a two-to-one ratio with respect to the two entities, but equally in
regard to each ethnicity: Croat, Bosnian, and Serb. The House of Peoples consists of fifteen
members with five Croats, five Bosnians and five Serbs. The basic ratio must be fulfilled for
the quorum to function. The members of the House of Peoples are elected by each entity's
bodies. The House of Representatives has forty-two members, with two-thirds from the Fed-
eration and one-third from the Serb Republic. They are directly elected. The combined
houses are headed by a rotating chair, and two deputy Chairs, one from each "nationality."
One view of these ethnic quotas is that they were meant to instill confidence for each ethnic
group that their concerns would be accommodated, and that each group would receive fair
representation. In reality, it is arguable that these quotas do not force cooperation but ensure
the perpetuation of ethnic division. Moreover, they may simply paralyze the function of
government.
41. Liberalization in the guise of democracy is not a phenomena unique to the Dayton
Agreement. As Freji and Robinson point out in a case study of recent electoral trends in
Jordan, what is frequently at the core of a political liberalization policy, is a mode of transi-
tion from authoritarian to democratic rule. They argue, "it is much more fruitful in a state
such as Jordan to understand liberalization as a product of 'strategic choices' made by
'authoritarian incumbents' in response to 'contingencies' then to focus solely on political,
social and economic structures as the causal precondition for democracy." Hanna Y. Freji &
Leonard C. Robinson, Liberalization, the Islamists, and the Stability of the Arab State: Jor-
dan as a Case Study, LXXXVI THE MUSLIM WORLD 1, 2 (1996). The point is a valid one to
keep in mind in the Bosnian context. The liberalization process is not necessarily the product
of rational choices by state elites which have their mutual guarantees to the forefront of
strategic political choices.
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to them, there is strong evidence of "low" and not "high" democracy in
their product.4' For the purpose of the legal analysis here it is important
to reflect on the fact that implicit in this "democratic export" by the me-
diating Western states is the legal system which supports and enforces
it. Legality may not only fail on its own internal terms of reference, but
be complicit in a much deeper wound on Bosnian society.
The Dayton Agreement spelled out the new constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 3 which provided that the two entities, Republika
Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are to be re-
garded as members of a federal state, the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 4 It guarantees that Bosnia and Herzegovina "shall be a
democratic state, one which shall operate under the rule of law and with
free and democratic elections., 45 From the outset we must understand
that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a child of the inter-
national community. The Constitution was negotiated at Dayton and
accepted by the internal parties concerned in three separate declara-
tions.46 This is a Dayton constitution and not a Bosnian constitution. The
42. The political elites in Bosnia are clearly driven by real and strategic ethnic nation-
alism. As Liah Greenfeld points out in her comparative analysis with Russian nationalism,
"the respective social elites of these societies have a vested interest in ethnic nationalism,
while democratization is emphatically contrary to the interests of these elites, perhaps even
more so than was communism." Liah Greenfeld, War and Ethnic Identity in Eastern Europe:
Does the Post-Yugoslav Crisis Portend Wider Chaos?, in THIS TIME WE KNEW: WESTERN
RESPONSES TO GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA 304, 309 (T Cushman & S. Mestrovic eds., 1996).
43. See DPA, supra note 2, at 125-30.
44. The EC countries had moved to recognize Bosnia on April 7, 1992. See generally
Roland Rich, Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 4 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 36, 50 (1993). Prior to this, the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on
Yugoslavia (the "Badinter Arbitration Commission") had concluded in its Opinion No. 1 of
November 29, 1991, that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution. See Alain Pellet, The
Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination
of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 178, 182 (1992). It has further noted in Opinion 4, that al-
though correct constitutional processes had been followed in seeking to gain independence
for the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the absence of a referendum on the matter meant that
the conditions for independence has not been satisfied. See id. at 49. A referendum quickly
followed, which was boycotted by the Serbian minority, but overwhelmingly passed by a
turnout of 63.4% of the remaining population. See id. Bosnia and Herzegovina was recog-
nized as an independent state when admitted to the United Nations on May 22, 1992. See
NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA A SHORT HISTORY 234-52 (1996). The agreement to create a
Muslim-Croat federation was signed in Washington on March 1, 1994, with United States
assistance. For greater detail on the substance of the agreement, see MALCOLM, supra, at
256-58.
45. See DPA, supra note 2, at 125.
46. See Paolo Gaeta, The Dayton Agreements and International Law, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L.
147, 161 (1996). The international scope of the document as Gaeta points out is underlined
by the observation that the Constitution was drafted in English and not in the language of
any of the three parties primarily concerned with its contents. See id. at 160.
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difference in what that means is quite substantial. The Constitution is
not the product of a lengthy internal "consensus" seeking. While not
foisted upon the parties either, and thus not external to them, the Con-
stitution is a document born of the reality of a compact made between
an existing and internationally recognized state with insurrectional
groups wielding de facto control over part of the territory of that state .
1. Entities and Citizens
The Constitution is not a document of one nation, but a document
that recognizes three nations within its confines. Under the Constitution,
the Republika Srpska is recognized as one "entity," a concession to the
aspirations of nationhood demanded by its political leadership."
Equally, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is acknowledged as
an "entity." In fact, the term "entity" appears fifty-five times in the
document, the term "citizen" only appears seven times.49 The schizo-
phrenia of the document is located in its attempts to reconcile multiple
personalities. Thus, there is both the state of Bosnia Herzegovina and
the "entities," there is citizenship for the individual located both in the
state and the "entities, 50 and passports are issued both by the state and
the "entities."51 This is not a constitution whose primary goal is navi-
gating the relationship between the individual citizen and the state. 2 The
Constitution is a document binding "entities," politically estranged ter-
ritories forced into a marriage of convenience by the international
community. It is not the product of political consensus between leaders
and peoples. This is not a peoples' constitution, but an agreement of
geographical coercion glued together by common institutions of which
the constitution is a part.
At Dayton, there was little hope that the parties negotiating settle-
ment were in a position to avoid the imposition of a constitution. 3 The
47. Id. at 161.
48. See DPA, supra note 2, at 125-30.
49. See id.
50. See id. By this, citizenship is granted at two levels, the national and the entity level,
and the entity has the first right to issue a passport. Only those not covered by their entities
will receive their passport from the national government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
51. See id.
52. As pointed out to me by Dr. Zoran Papic, the word citizen does not appear in the
normative portion of the Constitution. See id.
53. Wolin notes that a constitution in setting limits to politics also sets limits to democ-
racy, frequently constituting it in ways compatible with and legitimating of the dominant
power groups in the society. See Sheldon S. Wolin, Fugitive Democracy, in DEMOCRACY
AND DIFFERENCE; CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 35 (Seyla Benhabib ed.,
1996). The Dayton constitutional result reflects this reality. The negotiating parties were well
aware of the Western demand for a constitutional document, and the perceived centrality of
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guarantor states, all democratic in orientation, would have seen the
commitment to a constitution as proof of the parties' good-will towards
negotiation and peaceful resolution. For the parties themselves, a mini-
malist view of the obligations contained in a democratic constitution
(regular open elections held periodically) would allow them to consti-
tute the internal structural arrangements to their own nationalistic
advantage.54 This is precisely the outcome that has been achieved. The
Constitution seals the tripartite division of the state, neatly concealed in
a package that glosses division with the illusion of rapprochement.
2. Sovereignty and Integrity
The Constitution itself is capable of undermining the sovereignty
that comprises the notion of the nation state. State sovereignty is
indisputably linked with territorial integrity. The integrity of the state is
weakened when the state is divided into self-reliant entities and cracked
further by power-sharing formulas that encourage fissure. This is
another paradox contained in the Constitution. It bases Bosnia's claim to
sovereignty and territorial integrity on international law, recognizing the
state to exist within its internationally acknowledged borders. With that
claim to sovereignty goes the creation of central government for the
state. However, the political reality is that central government is a
misnomer. It is the entities who have the greater autonomy; the ceding
of power has come from the center, from the state to the internal
statelets. For example, while the central government conducts foreign
the Western constitutional model to transition and stability by the guarantor states. It takes
little imagination to understand that if the parties were content to concede the principle that
they accepted a constitution for which they gained Western approval, while in fact they really
only agreed to a minimalist constitution while advancing their own ethnic hegemony within
the document.
It is worth noting that the constitutional structure for Bosnia has its basis in a 1982 pro-
posal of the five-state "Contact Group" that that prepared recommendations for Namibia's
independence. This was also the basis for the Paris Agreements on the Cambodian transition.
See Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, October
23, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 74. See generally Stephen P. Marks, The New Cambodian Constitution:
From Civil War to a Fragile Democracy, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 45, 56 (1994).
54. See generally Wolin, supra note 53. Wolin argues persuasively that constitutions are
tools which facilitate limitations to both politics and democracy. He states:
Constitutional democracy is democracy fitted to a constitution. It is not democratic
or democratized constitutionalism because it is democracy without the demos as
actor. Its politics is based not, as its defenders allege, upon "representative democ-
racy" but on various representations of democracy: democracy as represented in
public opinion polls, electronic town meetings and phone-ins, and as votes. In
sum, a constitution regulates the amount of democracy that is let in.
Id at 34.
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policy, defense policy is the responsibility of the entities." While the
rhetoric of the DPA has concentrated on the international commitment
to a united Bosnia, both politically and militarily the reality is very
different. As Hansen points out, "the distribution of power between
national and federal levels illustrates a grave disjunction between the
military and political sphere."56 The presumptions in the divisions of
power within the state do not presuppose a unified Bosnia, rather the
opposite, fragmented and polarized statelets.
Most problematic is that there is the potential for the Constitution
itself to endanger rights rather than protect them. For example, the
multi-ethnicity of the Federation may well be unconstitutional by the
Constitution itself. The Constitution leaves little scope for protecting
multiple rather than singular identities. It is not a document that seeks to
carve out a middle ground of inclusiveness protecting rights. Rather,
rights are the product of one's self and community definition, presumed
to be based on exclusivity.
3. Multiplying Constitutions
The problem of fragmentation has been compounded by the creation
of separate constitutions within each of the recognized "entities" under
the DPA. Each of the entities has established their own Constitutions
and has been given wide powers under Annex 4 to proscribe and enforce
laws in fields such as, inter alia, defense, police, citizenship, the issuing
of passports, criminal matters, property law, finance, and even external
relations and cooperation with other states 7 It would seem inconceiv-
able to most states to create and endorse opposing centers of legal and
political powers within their domestic confines. In short, it would be a
form of sovereign suicide for a state. In allowing each entity enormous
autonomy to make and enforce law, a natural consequence has been the
strengthening of the ethnic partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In each
entity the institutional structures of the "semi" states reflect one group
and are dominated by nationalist parties who are largely committed to
55. Defense issues are of course also subject to the Dayton Agreement, in particular
Annex I-B of the same. See generally Bonnie Jenkins, The Enhancement of Political and
Military Stability in the Former Yugoslavia through the use of International Law: Annex i-B
of the General Framework Agreement, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1920 (1996). It is also argu-
able that the preoccupation with arms control and military balances in the territory of Bosnia
presumes a fragmented, not an integrated future. See Chester A. Crocker & Fen Osler Hamp-
son, Making Peace Settlements Work 104 FOREIGN POL., 64, 68-69 (1996).
56. See Hansen, supra note 32, at 80.
57. In addition, each entity was given the autonomy to enter into special parallel rela-
tionships with neighboring states. See DPA, supra note 2, at 125-130.
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their own communities and not to minorities." This weakness of the
common institutions serves only to make the entities more self-reliant
and to create a situation in which they build up institutional and govern-
ance capacity premised on separation while the communitarian
representation lags behind. 9 In this manner also, the common institu-
tions are perceived of as weak by their clients, the ordinary citizens of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the localized "ethnic" structures deliver
and seem both legitimate and credible statist structures.
The Republika Srpska has pursued its internal nationalistic agenda
by writing a separate constitution considerably at odds with the princi-
ple of a unitary state that rhetorically underpins the DPA. The
Federation has also written a separate constitution, compounding the
legal splintering of the jurisdiction. Recognizing the inherent problems
of accommodating two competing and irreconcilable constitutional vi-
sions of the state, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) sought
in the summer of 1997 to highlight these problems and suggest means
for their resolution. The "entity" constitutions have sought to exacerbate
the stranglehold of ethnicity politics by law. For example, the Republika
Srpska Constitution recognizes only Serbs as citizens of the entity.
Bosnians and Croats are legally constituted as lesser minorities.' The
observation by Yugoslav political theorist Vladimir Gligorov has been
solidly fortified, "Why should I be a minority in your state when you can
be a minority in mine?"'" This policy is not only a demotion in status from
the principle of equality the international community allegedly sought to
58. Domination by national parties has been particularly apparent as exemplified by re-
cent struggles between hard-line and marginally more moderate nationalist politicians for
political control of the Republic Serpska. See Hard-Liners ie Up Bosnian Serb Entity, INT'L
HERALD & TRIB., Dec. 29, 1997, at A5. See generally Mike O'Connor, Setback for West in
Bosnia Elections, INT'L HERALD & TRIB., Sept. 17, 1998, at A4.
59. As Hansen points out, "The only characteristic of a state denied to the entities is the
right to patrol or in any way enforce the inter-entity border." Hansen, supra note 32, at 80.
The lack of agreement on meaningful unitary state structures is illustrated by the deadlock
over currency between the entities. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims cannot agree on whose por-
traits should adorn their common banknotes.
60. As Pajic notes:
... the preamble of the [state] constitution defines Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs as
"constituent peoples" of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while "Others" and "citizens"
are mentioned only in passing. Thus, the preamble takes away state sovereignty
from the citizens and transfers it to the three ethnic groups; but even this rigorous
concept does not apply throughout the country. To be very precise, Bosniacs and
Croats are not constituent peoples in the entity of the Republika Serbska, and in
the same way Serbs are denied constituent people status in the Federation.
Pajic, supra note 27, at 134.
61. Woodward, supra note 1, at 108.
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inject into the peace-making process, it is a thorough reversal of the pre-
existing standing of peoples prior to the war. In the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia these peoples were defined as belonging
to constituent nations, to whom equal rights among and within the na-
tions accrued. The war and the state entities which emerged from it,
demoted these rights from those of nationhood and equality to minority
status. Thus, while the national structure of enforced constitutionalism
has not addressed the gap between minority and constituent nationality
head-on, the entities have done so by demoting minority rights in the
pursuit of a nationalistic agendas. It bears reminding that all persons in
Bosnia and Herzegovina are minorities, but that minority is a feature of
geographical location. While the status of individual as minority is rela-
tive in Bosnia, legal affiliation should strive to be normative and not
dependent here. Such a leap is still missing, absent on the grounds of
political expediency.
4. International Standards and the Constitution
A notable feature of the document is its "internationalist" character.
It is "international friendly," a clear consequence of the environment of
its birth. Thus, it is a constitution which attaches great importance to
international rules and principles, with a notable emphasis on human
rights.62 Particular attention can be given to Art. II, para. 2. whereby "the
rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols
shall apply directly in Bosnia Herzegovina. These shall have priority
over all other law." 
63
There can be no doubt that the status given to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR) is of great symbolic value in the new
62. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International
Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, and, the Universal Declaration. However, concrete
protection for human rights has been markedly absent from the peace-making process. Carl
Bildt pointed out the failures as follows: "Respect for human rights and rule of law are per-
quisites for a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite commitments to uphold the
highest standards of human rights protections, the parties have not fulfilled their obligations
in this regard." UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF HIGH REPRESENTATIVE CARL BILDT TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. S/1996/542 (1996). One commentator has noted that the
Preamble to the Constitution lacks reference to the general principles of international law,
viewed as regrettable but explained by the United States influence on the drafting of the text.
See Pajic, supra note 27, at 129.
63. Eric Stein notes that drafters of constitutions in the post-communist states of Central
and Eastern Europe tend to recognize that respect for basic rights and rule of law are foun-
dations of a new democratic order and for admission to the "Western European democratic
community of nations" See Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Towards Interna-
tionalization of Central-European Constitutions?, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 427, 429 (1994).
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legal order. If it were to be accorded practical daily significance in par-
allel with that status, its importation might have far reaching results.
However, there are inherent shortcomings to be acknowledged, both of
the Convention itself and of the deep seated problems within the local
legal order which will need to be resolved within the European Conven-
tion framework. There is a grave danger that a failure of the Convention
in Bosnia would undermine the credibility of the ECHR protection sys-
tem itself. The ECHR has been the leading regional human rights
system since its inception in 195 3 .6 It has been stalwart in creating an
accessible human rights structure with a marked emphasis on the pro-
tection of individual rights. 65 The hallmark of the system has been its
commitment to the individual. This convention has developed a sophis-
ticated jurisprudence, marked by a commitment to due process and an
expansion of the boundaries of entitlement for the singular person.66 The
ECHR is not a system or a jurisprudence marked by a pre-occupation
with group or minority rights, nor is its jurisprudence noted for con-
fronting situations of gross and systematic violations of rights.67 A
number of commentators have remarked upon the limited capacity of
the European system to confront mass violations of human rights.6 If
64. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
65. See Christian Tomuschat, Quo Vadis, Argentoratum? The Success Story of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and a Few Dark Stains, 13 HUM. RTS. L. J. 410, 406
(1992) (describing the European system as focused on individual applications).
66. On due process rights as the hallmark of the Convention, see generally Conor
Gearty, The European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Civil Liberties, 52
CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 89-127 (1993).
67. See Oren Gross, "Once More unto the Breach": The Systemic Failure of Applying
the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE. J. INT'L L.
437, 500-08 (1998). This is in marked contrast to the Inter-American human rights system.
The American Convention on Human Rights was born out of the experience of the hemi-
sphere. See Dinah L. Shelton, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human
Rights: Emergent Norms, in INT'L HUM. RTs L. THEORY & PRAC. 369 (Irwin Cotler & F.
Pearl Eliadis eds., 1992). This Convention was adopted in 1969. See The American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1, 9 I.L.M. at 673. The Inter-American Court
was formally instituted in 1979, and consists of seven judges elected by state parties to this
Convention. See id. at 16. As I have previously pointed out, "it should be pointed out that the
Inter-American Commission, as a body of the O.A.S. Charter, has functioned reasonably well
in its dealings with situations of gross and systematic violations of human rights occurring in
the territory of Member States" Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: Differ-
ences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 101, 131 (1995).
68. See Aisling Reidy et al., Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the European
Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey, 15 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 161 (1997). See
also, Meno T. Kamminga, Is the European Convention on Human Rights Sufficiently
Equipped to Cope with Gross and Systematic Violations? 12 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 153 (1997)
(commenting on the disappointing experience of the Convention in its supervision of gross
and systematic violations of human rights).
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we acknowledge that the European human rights order is struggling to
gain institutional capacity in confronting massive human rights viola-
tions, premised not only on individual denials of rights but premised
upon destruction polices aimed at the group, Bosnia will be a testing
ground. The European Convention has to learn a language for system-
atic violations and must evolve mechanisms, either through the
adjustment of individual rights or through the creative absorption of
group issues into the individual rights prism in order to confront the
kinds of violations that have taken place in Bosnia adequately. 9 The
European Convention has been "smuggled into the legal order of Bosnia
and Herzegovina." 70 There should be no expectations that it has tailor-
made solutions to the scale and type of human rights violations that took
place during the war in Bosnia and which accompany the post-war
phase.
Positively, the use of the Convention in Bosnia may set a new and
innovative course for the European system in its dealings with the hard
issues of group identity in divided societies and the appropriate reme-
dies necessary to confront gross violations of rights. These are the kinds
of issues that lie ahead of the European Convention as it expands east-
ward and absorbs the former Soviet states under its mantle. 7' For Bosnia,
it should be evident that there is no panacea to confront its human rights
69. The struggle for this language and an adequate response to systematic violations are
not unique to Bosnia. The European Court and Commission have been plagued by similar
issues, particularly in respect of human rights violations from Turkey. One recent response
by the Court has been to place a greater emphasis on the implementation of Article 13 of the
Convention in the domestic context. See id.
70. Pajic, supra note 27, at 131.
71. On the issues related to Russia's accession to the Council of Europe, see generally
Bill Bowering, Russia's Accession to the Council of Europe and Human Rights: Compliance
or Cross-Purposes, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS L. REV. 628 (1997). Bowering raises the concern that
Russia's non-compliance with the Convention would have major consequences for the le-
gitimacy of the Council of Europe. Rolv Ryssdall also pinpoints concerns about the
expansion of the Council that have a clear resonance for Bosnia. He states:
the Convention community will be exposed to new influences and traditions. It is
no secret that despite the best efforts of these states their legal traditions are not
yet in a position to meet the standards required by the Convention. When the Con-
vention was drafted, the rights selected for protection.., were presumed to be
already guaranteed in the legal order of those states. The Convention was thus
based on already existing constitutional rights. For many of the new Member
States the situation has been inverted; their new constitutions, in so far as they
concern human rights, have often drawn heavily on the Convention.
Rolv Ryssdall, The Coming of Age of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 EUR.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 26 (1996). See also Susan Marks, The European Convention on Human
Rights and its "Democratic Society," 66 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 209 (1996) (commenting on
the relationship between democracy and rights in the Convention).
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violations, past and present. The Convention is a tool which gives a con-
crete language to human rights in the domestic sphere, but needs
adjustment and creative expansion if it is to come to meet the expecta-
tions that have been set for it. Equally important to grasp is the reality
that notwithstanding the impressive importation of rights and freedoms
from international human rights law, they cannot by themselves undo
the deleterious effects of the establishment of entities with single or
dominant ethnies, whose very existence continue to undermine the most
basic of rights.
Finally, the importation of international standards with precedental
status over local law is a reminder of the anxiety of the international
community over the willingness of the parties to comply with the com-
mitments they were undertaking. International standards and oversight
mechanisms were an insurance policy for domestic failure.73 Unfortu-
nately, it remains the case that these impressive human rights
protections are hostage to political fortunes. They can be completely
paralyzed by the strong political institutions in the entities which ce-
ment the country's ethnic divisions.74
5. Constitutional Evolutions?
Given the limitations described above, what hope is there for the
Constitution to facilitate a meaningful amelioration for the status of the
rule of law and the protection of rights in post-Dayton Bosnia? First,
despite its limitations and the uncomfortable compact it contains, a
written constitution has enormous symbolic importance in the post-war
period. It stands as a commitment to legalism and structure, a stark
72. This is evident in examining DPA Annex 4, supra, Art. II, para. 8, entitled coopera-
tion. It binds the authorities to co-operate with and provide unrestricted access to: "any
international human rights monitoring mechanisms established for Bosnia and Herzegovina;
the supervisory bodies established by any of the international agreements listed in Annex I to
[the] Constitution; the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia... and any other
organization authorized by the United Nations Security Council with a mandate concerning
human rights or humanitarian law." DPA, supra note 2, at 120-121.
73. See generally Ustinia Dolgopol, A Feminist Appraisal of the Dayton Peace Accords,
19 ADEL. L. REV. 59 (1997).
74. A Bosnian journalist highlights the point admirably:
Everyone swears on the Dayton peace agreement, on an integral Bosnia, on human
rights and respect and pluralism, on the importance of free and fair elections and a
dozen nice similar phrases, which are tomorrow supposed to turn Bosnia into a
Balkan Switzerland. However, the contrast between reality and words is increas-
ing. Today's Bosnia is nothing but a castle in the air, whose parts are still being
held together by some curious miracle.
Zoran Pirolic, Will Bosnia Survive the Dayton Peace? A Game with Open Cards, DANI,
April 26, 1996.
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contrast to the trenchant engagement in military politics that character-
ized political life in Bosnia since 1991. Installing a constitution is a
signal to society that the rules on political and social behavior are being
regulated and will bear scrutiny.75 The absorption of that basic creed by
a state's citizenry may have a crucial sociological impact on their per-
ception of the state and their status within it.
Second, constitutions can also be subject to change and evolution.76
The Bosnian Constitution specifically includes provisions for amend-
ment." The procedure requires a decision of the Parliamentary
Assembly, with a two-thirds majority of those present in favor of any
change. Article X(2) specifically limits constitutional amendments from
extinguishing or limiting any rights set out in Article II of the Constitu-
tion. It is clear that in the current polarized political climate,
constitutional amendment is unlikely in the short-term. Nonetheless,
with greater public awareness of the extent to which the Constitution
itself is responsible for the tripartite fragmentation of the state along
ethnic lines, some movement may be possible. Equally, the international
community must play its part. A greater acknowledgement that the
Dayton Constitution does little to facilitate an integrative multi-ethnic
state may encourage the international community, which is in a defacto
position of trusteeship in Bosnia,7 to foster domestic politics that seek
to outgrow the nationalistic straightjacket produced by the Constitution.
Similar to my proposals on the Dayton Agreement itself, significant
75. For this view in the context of the framing of the United States Constitution, see
generally M. FARRAND, FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
76. This observation is equally valid for any society that has adopted a written constitu-
tion. See Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON
557-558 (M. PETERSON ED. 1975), in which Thomas Jefferson suggests that the Constitution
should be amended in every generation, in part in order to promote general attention to pub-
lic affairs.
77. See DPA, supra note 2, at 125.
78. International law recognizes many kinds of dependant states, the status of the state
being largely governed by the facts of each state's own situations. Various terms can be em-
ployed to describe dependant states. They include vassal states, protected states,
protectorates, colonial protectorates or trusteeships. On these entities, see generally I
HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-97 (1940); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§§ 90-94 (Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1995). Trusteeship may be one appropriate analogy for the
situation of the Bosnian state. The trusteeship system was established under Article 75-91 of
the United Nations Charter. Brierly outlines the functions of the International Trusteeship
system as follows: "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement
of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each
territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as
may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement." J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 181 (Sir Humphrey Waldock, 6th ed. 1963).
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portions of the Constitution should be viewed as transitionary. As Bos-
nia progresses away from violence, society and the constitution should
evolve towards a more homogenous framework, premised on multicul-
turalism and multi-ethnicity. The goal should be to create the conditions
that would facilitate positive constitutional growth to take place. This
would require carving out a space for the "middle" non-ethnic political
voice, which is entirely excluded from the current political spectrum.
It would also require another step. This is the more pervasive project
of creating and building constitutional consciousness and consensus
within the state. This is a long-term educational process, which seeks to
involve citizenry intimately in the legitimization and building of the
bedrock for a constitution. It requires political elites and the interna-
tional community to seek out and inform local communities and
ordinary citizens about their constitution. This project, demonstrated
concretely in the South African transition, gives citizenry a sense of
ownership in their constitution.79 It promotes knowledge, encourages
input into the unfolding constitutional structure, and encourages litiga-
tion. In the context of concrete physical needs in Bosnia, such an
enterprise has the air of luxury. This is not the case. If Bosnia is to be
transformed into a rule of law state, ordinary citizens must be co-opted
into that process. Equally, if state building is viewed as a fluid co-
operative exercise, movement upon and participation in the constitu-
tional process is an assertive addition to the endeavor.
6. The Common Institutions-A Closer Look
at the Constitutional Court
Just as it has been ill-conceived to perceive of ethnic conflict in
unidimensional terms, so too must the international community avoid
the dangerous path of conceiving of reconstruction in simplistic terms.
It is clear that the unification of Bosnia and Herzegovina has little pros-
pect for success unless there is more to hold it together than the
''common institutions," which receive minimal funding and grudging
support from the Republika Srpska. There has been no intensive
thought given to the extent to which legal institutions constitute
79. In particular it is worth noting the creation of a negotiation process involving a wide
spectrum of society in the formation of a constitution. It was the de Klerk government which
established a negotiation process, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, to produce
a new Constitution. See Excerpts from Address by de Klerk on Change, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3.
1990, at B6; see also Alexander Johnston, Introduction: South Africa Since February 1990,
in CONSTITUTION MAKING IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 1 (Alexander Johnston et al. eds.,
1993); Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, 21 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV 235 (1989).
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"common institutions."' Foremost among such legal structures is the
Constitutional Court. At best, this body could operate as a standard
bearer for rebuilding confidence in the rule of law, a meaningful symbol
of a functional unitary Bosnia. At worst, it could degenerate into a
squabbling forum for the hand-picked representatives of the "entities," a
means to subvert rather than support the inter-dependency of the state.
Article VI of Annex 4 of the DPA sets up the Constitutional Court.
Its task is to uphold the constitution. The Constitutional Court of the
Federation was officially inaugurated on January 11, 1996 in Sarajevo.'
Three of its nine members are selected by the President of the European
Court of Human Rights, after consultation with the Bosnian Presidency,
the other six shall be elected by the Entities. 2 All of the members of the
Constitutional Court are to be appointed for an initial term of five years
and are not eligible for reappointment. The Constitutional Court's man-
date includes determining whether laws made within the legislative
competence of the "entities" are consistent with the constitution. It will
also have appellate jurisdiction over issues under the Convention arising
out of any judgment from a court in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its decisions
are final and binding. As the institutions and political hierarchies in both
entities are dominated by nationalist political personages, there can be
real concern that the judicial appointment process will be a reflection of
those politics. 3 Other power-sharing institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
80. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AID AND ACCOUNTABILITY: DAYTON IMPLE-
MENTATION iii (November 1996) [hereinafter AID AND ACCOUNTABILITY]. Carl Bildt, the
first High Representative for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, outlined the
difficulties of the common structures in September 1996 stating that the "most difficult and
most decisive phase of peace implementation" in 1996, following elections, would be the
setting up of common institutions and the arrangements for "true and genuine power shar-
ing." See 33 UN CHRONICLE (1996).
81. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE
ANNUAL REPORT (1995). The CEELI program was significantly involved in making the start-
up of the Court possible. It provided technical assistance and a two-week workshop for the
justices in Washington D.C., in June 1995.
82. This description draws heavily on that provided by James Slone. See James Slone,
The Dayton Peace Agreement: Human Rights Guarantees and Their Implementation, 7 Eur.
J. Int'l L. 207, 215 (1995).
83. Such a fear is confirmed by the recent decision of the Bosnian Parliament to desig-
nate for the position of head of the Parliament's Human Rights and Refugee Affairs Board a
man who is suspected in 1992 for having organized rape camps and other atrocities. All three
political parties in the Parliament voted in favor of his appointment. Until news spread of his
alleged prior actions no challenge was made to his position. Thereafter, the Party of Demo-
cratic Action acknowledged its mistake in supporting his candidacy. It is also notable that the
internal and external international community ignored the event and its implications for local
confidence in the rule of law.
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based on the principle of ethnic quotas, have resulted only in gridlock
and have not been productive.
The role of an independent judiciary in a society, which has and
continues to experience violence, is paramount.M Discharging that obli-
gation is most difficult for the judges in states such as Bosnia which
manifest the ongoing effects of a prolonged conflict and a difficult
peace. Under the Bosnian Constitution, the judiciary retains significant
room for recognizing fundamental rights when interpreting statutory
provisions, implementing provisions that conform to principles of fun-
damental justice, and conducting judicial proceedings. Doing so
impartially and professionally is pivotal to maintaining and securing
confidence in the rule of law and justice itself. It is of paramount im-
portance that the judiciary itself is aware of its obligations. In order for
this to occur a minimum requirement is that officials appointed to judi-
cial office hold the minimal degree of training and are appointed with a
view to their independence. 5 In fulfilling the requirements of judicial
impartiality, appointed judges themselves have a particular responsibil-
ity to act in a manner that furthers the perception and the reality of their
independence from the state. Judges in Bosnia-Herzegovina will carry a
heavy burden of distrust and skepticism about law and legality that is
the legacy of violent internal conflict. It is a burden that only their active
participation and collective integrity may overcome. At the top of the
judicial apex is the Constitutional Court. The example set by this judi-
cial body will have definite a effect on other courts and on the response
of the watching public.
The Constitutional Court is one of the common institutions envis-
aged by Dayton as a means to mesh the entities into a state-like
existence and force reliance and inter-dependence. Political cooperation
among the entities has been sparse and intermittent with respect to both
common institutions and other matters." While the Constitutional Court
84. Article 1 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judici-
ary stresses that judicial independence must be guaranteed by the state and enshrined in the
laws or constitution of each state. See Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,
G.A. Res. 146, U.N. GAOR 40th Sess, Supp. No. 53, at 254, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).
85. Article 10 requires tt.at "In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination
against a person on the grounds of race, color, sex, religion, political or other opinion, natu-
ral or social origin, property, birth or status" This minimal standard is clearly enunciated in
the UN Principles on the Judiciary. See id.
86. Inter-ethnic co-operation is still sparse and subject to political dictates. Many of the
common institutions outlined in the DPA have not seen the light of day, and institutions of
the wartime Bosnia-Herzegovina are still in place. The international conference on Bosnia
held in Paris on November 14, 1996 saw this as one of its major points of concern. For ex-
ample the Human Rights Chamber has been faced with almost a complete lack of
cooperation from the Entities governments. See HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND
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has been less subject to interference than have other bodies, it still re-
mains in a precarious position, a hostage to the political fortunes of
nationalistic agendas.
E. The Role of Internal International Actors
The role of the High Representative is crucial to any analysis of
post-conflict re-building in Bosnia. The Office of the High Representa-
tive has primary responsibility for promoting "full compliance with all
civilian aspects of the peace settlement." 17 In addition, the High Repre-
sentative is to oversee the efforts of the parties to rebuild the structures
and institutions of government and their endeavors to promote human
rights.U The High Representative is able to call on international donors,
including the World Bank and the European Union, and to withhold aid
from those who fail to live up to their Dayton commitments. The High
Representative's function is a hybrid of executive and enforcement re-
sponsibilities. On the one hand he is a political trouble-shooter, on the
other hand he is a mere civil servant overseeing the formal agreements
consentingly entered into by the parties themselves. His office is a layer
of the cast on the broken body of the Bosnian state. In seeking to mend
the physical structures, external actors play the critical role in holding
the broken pieces together. The potential for success is predominantly
linked to the willingness of the fragmented entities to be thus bound.
Nonetheless, the High Representative has some independent capac-
ity to enforce compliance by the parties to the Dayton Agreement.
Security Council Resolution 1022 gave the High Representative the
power to recommend the immediate re-imposition of sanctions, should
the parties fail to fulfill their obligations. The High Commissioner has
been subject to some criticism for his narrow interpretation of that
HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY, May 1997. Recommendations by the Ombud-
swoman for Human Rights have equally remained impotent. Some progress has been made.
For example, following extensive negotiations the central government (the Council of Min-
isters) with the two co-prime ministers was formed on January 3, 1997 by the Parliamentary
Assembly. This was the first time that the representatives of the three communities sat down
together in the Assembly. It remains the case that neither the Presidency nor the Assembly
fulfill their constitutional roles.
87. The DPA, supra note 2, Annex 10, Art. II, para. 1, directs the High Representative to
"(a) monitor the implementation of the peace settlement; [and] (b) maintain close contact
with the Parties to promote their full compliance with all the civilian aspects of the peace
settlement and a high level of cooperation between them and the organizations and agencies
participating in those aspects."
88. See id. In addition, the High Representative has access to all the information con-
cerning the activities of all external and national bodies who are operating in Bosnia. See id.,
Annex 10, Art. II, para. 1(c). The High Representative himself reports to the United Nations,
European Union, United States, Russian Federation, and other interested governments, par-
ties and organizations. See id., Annex 10, para. 1(f).
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power and for remaining silent "in the face of mounting evidence of the
parties' non-compliance with crucial parts of their civilian obligations
under the Peace Agreement " '8 9 An early lack of confidence in the High
Commissioner's Office is also blamed for the paucity of investment in
materials and diplomatic resources in that agency, which contributed to
subsequent robust criticisms of its lack of effectiveness in the field.'
The Office of the High Representative is also responsible for draft-
ing a quick start program of legislation aimed at piecing Bosnia and
Herzegovina back together. This has not yet been implemented. The
quick-start program includes provisional laws on international economic
relations, citizenship and passport provisions, a provisional central
bank, the duration of the parliamentary mandate, immunity, presidential
succession, air traffic regulations, and the 1997 state budget.9 ' In addi-
tion, other international non-governmental organizations have concerned
themselves with drafting domestic legislation. The Central and East
European Law Initiative (CEELI) has been advising the Bosnian gov-
ernment in respect of the forthcoming criminal procedural and penal
codes.92 While these international efforts are well intentioned attempts to
transform the framework of law inherited from the former Yugoslavia, a
word of caution is warranted. Fundamental structural changes to the le-
gal order need to maintain a delicate balance between intrusion and
genuine assistance. For such changes to take root in the local legal and
political culture there must be an attempt to build a "bottom up" consen-
sus that such changes are warranted and will be supported by domestic
legal actors and institutions. It is insufficient for outsiders to create per-
fect paper rules, if they are meaningless to and suffer a lack of support
from the community that they are intended to benefit.
1. The Human Rights Commission
The Human Rights Commission ("the Commission") was
established under Annex 6 of the Dayton Agreement. It consists of an
Ombudsperson and a Human Rights Chamber.93 The task of both
89. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA POST
DAYTON: CHALLENGES FOR THE FIELD 2 (1996).
90. See Elizabeth M. Cousens, Making Peace in Bosnia Work, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
789, 815 (1997).
91. See REPORT OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. DOC.
S-1996/814, para 86.
92. See 8 CEELI UPDATE 4, 5 (1997).
93. For a thorough discussion of these bodies, see Jessica Simor, Tackling Human
Rights Abuses in Bosnia, 6 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 644 (1997). Thus far, the Chamber has
heard six cases and made eight admissibility decisions. As of May 31, 1997, 1003 provi-
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institutions is to investigate alleged violations of the Human Rights
protections entrenched by Dayton. In essence, this means that both
bodies have the duty of ensuring that the European Convention on
Human Rights, its Protocols, and all additional rights protected by the
international agreements listed in Appendix to Annex 6 are observed
and enforced in the post-war Bosnia.
The creation of the Commission is a testament to the reality that
external standards and actors were essential to facilitate the protection
of Human Rights in post-war Bosnia. The intimate responsibility of the
international community for the day-to-day upkeep of legal protections
is illustrated by the Human Rights Commission. The institution is the
creation of the international community. The indefinitely envisaged ap-
pointment of eight members of the Human Rights Chamber by the
Council of Europe is indicative of the long-term tutelage the domestic
legal system faces. ' The Commission is an example of the lack of faith
in the domestic state's ability to run certain affairs to international satis-
faction, thereby creating the need for international personnel to do the
job instead." While this ambivalence about domestic capacity and
goodwill may well have been warranted at the time of signing the Day-
ton Agreement, there are some inherent dangers in choosing the path of
internal trusteeship for the international and local community. External
responsibility may create a monopoly that does not encourage internal
capacity building. The international community cannot hope (nor wish)
to act in loco parentis to the Bosnian state indefinitely. However, with-
out practically encouraging localized responsibility for enforcement and
oversight of legal protections, the path to genuine rather than superficial
reconstruction will be much slower.
2. The Office of Ombudsperson
The Human Rights Ombudsperson is authorized to investigate
"alleged or apparent violations of human rights." Her role is to take
sional files had been opened in Sarajevo and 463 in Banja Luka. The Ombudsperson is Dr.
Gret Hailer. See id. at 649-50.
94. The eight members were appointed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, pursuant to resolution (93)6, as foreign members who were not citizens of neigh-
boring states.
95. DPA, supra note 2, Annex 6, Chapter 2 sets out the framework of the Commission
on Human Rights. It is to consist of an Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber. The first
appointee, who is to hold office for five years (non-renewable term), is not to be a citizen of
Bosnia and Herzegovina or of any neighboring state. The Ombudsman is to appoint his own
staff. The appointment is to be made by the "Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE" after Con-
sultation with the parties. See id., Art. IV, para 2.
96. Id., Annex 6, Art. V, para. 2. Other Ombudsmen include the international Ombud-
sperson and the Office of the Federation Ombudspersons report that seventy percent of all
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cases only where an individual complainant is prepared to come for-
ward. She has no authority to investigate violations on behalf of a class
of complainants. The findings of the Ombudsperson are to be made
public, and where a party in violation fails to adhere to the conclusions
and recommendations made, this is to be brought to the attention of the
High Representative. Simor has argued that the decision by the Ombud-
sperson to adopt procedural rules of admissibility mirrored upon the
European Convention (Articles 26 & 27) creates doubts as to the effi-
ciency and accessibility of her office."' She suggests that the office could
be creatively reformed by a number of internal reforms. These include:
first, that the Ombudsperson should take a less onerous position on ad-
missibility procedures, thus being able to exert jurisdiction over human
rights violations clearly outside the less expansive mandate of the Hu-
man Rights Chamber; and second, in those cases in which the
Ombudsperson decides not to proceed with an investigation, there
should be no need for expansive report for non-review. This would allow
her office greater time and resources to spend on those cases which
merit serious and committed investigation. In this context, the Ombud-
sperson would be well-served by taking note of the imaginative
approach taken by the ECHR in relation to admissibility criteria in the
recent past, particularly in relation to cases which demonstrate elements
of administrative practice. Finally, the office should proceed with an
investigation prior to deciding whether the case information discloses a
violation.98
The Office of the Ombudsperson has the potential to be a tool that
directly responds to human rights violations in an immediate and effi-
cient manner. The procedural reforms to make such a role possible are
well-documented and self-evident. However, the role of the Ombudsper-
son cannot be detached from the extensive international "take-over" of
domestic legal functions. The Ombudsperson is appointed by the Or-
ganization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. 99 There can be no
doubt that the selection procedure is designed to remove bias and parti-
san appointments. This is to be commended. However, in this wider
examination, it raises serious issues about the ability of the domestic
legal system to become self-reliant in the short and long term.
claims received concern property issues. It is estimated that over 600,000 people may be
affected by issues relating to property claims. The Commission for Real Property Claims of
Displaced Persons and Refugees was established by the DPA (Annex 7) to ensure the right of
displaced persons to have their homes restored to them or to receive compensation. See gen-
erally AiD AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 80.
97. See Simor, supra note 93, at 651-2.
98. See id. at 649-50.
99. See DPA, supra note 2, Art. VI.
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3. The Human Rights Chamber
The Human Rights Chamber (the "Chamber") is composed of four-
teen members, four from the Federation, two from the Republic Srpska,
with the remaining eight appointed by the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe.'00 The powers of the Chamber include the ability
to decide upon complaints of human rights violations referred to it by
the Ombudsperson or on the basis of complaints made directly by indi-
viduals.' O' The propagation of accountability mechanisms such as the
Ombudsperson has created layers of legal structure that overlap and to
some extent have similar aims. Significantly, the Dayton Agreement
does not spell out the relationship between the Ombudsperson and the
domestic prosecutorial system. Proliferation does not necessarily mean
efficiency or improved accountability. One strong image is that a two-
tier system of legal accountability has been created. This consists of an
existing and insufficiently funded domestic system, the supra-national
system of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, and a domestic-international structure which is an overlay on the
indigenous legal system. The linkages among the three structures re-
main imprecisely defined and subject to much local ambivalence.
4. Policing-The Internal and External Dimensions
The rehabilitation of domestic police forces is a crucial aspect of
transition in a society that has experienced conflict. This has a two-fold
aspect. First, civilianized police forces in a post-war society frequently
absorb demilitarized soldiers as a means to contain discontent resulting
from demobilization. This may create a surplus of unsuitable police of-
ficers and a public perception of their lack of professionalism. In
addition, where police forces may have been partisan to a particular
"side" of the conflict, their function mandates a restoration of neutrality
and the perception of even-handedness. Both of these problems need to
be overcome quickly. Second, police officers have an important confi-
dence-building role in demonstrating impartiality among communities
and satisfying the requirements of representativeness in ethnically
mixed and divided communities. The international community can be
instrumental in advancing both goals.0° In practice, the Implementation
100. Again, these members cannot be citizens of Bosnia, Herzegovina, or neighboring
states.
101. See DPA, supra note 2, Art. VIII, para. 2.
102. Similar international operations involving police rehabilitation include the experi-
ence of the U.N. transitional authority in Cambodia, in 1993. The civil police component of
the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was supposed to supervise
[Vol. 19:957
The Dayton Peace Agreement
Force (IFOR, now SFOR) has had only a limited involvement in the ci-
vilian implementation, including the establishment of the police force,
and the U.N. International Police Task Force (IPTF) has interpreted its
mandate in a limited manner.
The IPTF role, outlined in Annex 11 of the Dayton Agreement, is
entitled the "Agreement on International Police Task Force."1o3 Annex
11 outlines that the parties to the peace agreement were to request that
the Security Council establish a U.N. civilian police operation to assist
with law enforcement training, local law enforcement, and the facilita-
tion of a transition to civilian policing.1 4 Once the Dayton Agreement
was signed, the Secretary-General sent a police reconnaissance mission
to Bosnia. He subsequently outlined that "the Task Force will not exer-
cise any executive law enforcement functions. Its effectiveness will
depend, to an important extent, on the willingness of the parties to co-
operate with it in accordance with Article VI of Annex 11 to the Peace
the Phnom Penh police force to ensure its respect for the agreements reached. As Stephen
Marks points out:
There has been much controversy over the extent of UNTAC's powers and whether
it carried out effectively even the minimal level of control. The presence of inter-
national officials in the administrative and police offices did, in fact, produce some
valuable outcomes, along with some unfortunate mistakes and oversights.
UNTAC's principal weakness was its inability to prevent or remedy abusive prac-
tices.
Stephen P. Marks, Preventing Humanitarian Crises through Peace-Building and Democratic
Empowerment: Lessons from Cambodia, 1 MED. & GLOBAL SURVIVAL 208, 215 (1994).
103. DPA, supra note 2, Annex 11.
104. Article III of Annex 11 sets out the role of the IPTF as follows:
1. IPTF assistance includes the following evidence, to be provided in a pro-
gram designed and implemented by the IPTF Commissioner in
accordance with the Security Council decision described in Article 1(2).
(1) monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities
and facilities, including associated judicial organizations, struc-
tures and proceedings;
(2) advising law enforcement personnel and forces;
(3) training law enforcement personnel;
(4) facilitating, with the IPTF's mission of assistance, the Parties' law
enforcement activities
(5) assessing threats to public order and advising on the capability of
law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats;
(6) advising governmental authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovia on the or-
ganization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and
(7) assisting by accompanying the Parties' law enforcement personnel
as they carry out their responsibilities, as the IPTF deem appropri-
ate.
Id., Annex 11.
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Agreement."'o5 Based on this cooperative principle, the mandate of the
IPTF was confirmed by Security Council Resolution 1035 of December
21, 1995.
The IPTF has deployed more than 1,600 policemen from thirty-four
countries in forty stations around the country. Their primary function is
to advise and monitor the local police. They are authorized under the
Dayton Agreement to have access to all places and records of law en-
forcement and criminal justice. The IPTF Commissioner has much
leeway with the Minister of Interior of both entities owing to his influ-
ence with donors regarding aid to the Bosnian police forces.'0° In many
localities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the IPTF, having daily connection
with local authorities and communities alike, is the visible face of the
Dayton Agreement.
a. Operational Problems for the IPTF
The IPTF has encountered a number of problems since its concep-
tion and actualization on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One
outstanding and consistent problem for the IPTF has been the lack of
sufficient resources to fulfill their obligations under Dayton. This was
initially experienced in the limited deployment of police officers by do-
nor states in the jurisdiction.' 7 While the numbers deployed are now
consistent with the original mandate, problems persist in the technical
and material assistance provided to the officers on the ground.' 8 In order
to carry out their commitments in a complete and efficient manner,
having the resources needed for their work is a matter of priority.
However, as with many mixed post-conflict missions, it is clear that
international financial assistance is targeted to the high-profile actors,
currently the SFOR contingent. It is harder to convince donors that
105. U.N. Doc. S/1995/1031, para. 27.
106. Note that the High Representative is to provide guidance to and receive reports
from the Commission of the International Police Task Force. See DPA, supra note 2, Annex
11, Art. II, para. 1(g).
107. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA POST
DAYTON: CHALLENGES FOR THE FIELD 2 (1996).
108. Human Rights Watch reports the following problems:
For example, IPTF in Sanski Most, when Human Rights Watch visited on July 14,
has seventeen monitors and only two vehicles (onj of which was on loan because
the second vehicle was being repaired). The station had only two translators, no
telephone, and no base radio. The station commander reported to Human Rights
Watch/Helsinki that IPTF/Sanski Most was unable to perform at even the most ru-
dimentary level due to these resource problems.
See No Justice No Peace, The United Nations International Police Task Force's Roles in
Screening Local Law Enforcement, HUM. RTs. WATCH, Sept. 1996, at 15D.
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equal assistance should be prioritized to the "bread and butter" rebuild-
ing, which over the long-term will create the means and the stability to
ensure that the high-profile military actors can actually withdraw.
b. Differences in Legal Culture
A particular problem in the early stages of the IPTF deployment was
a notable lack of sensitivity to and knowledge of domestic legal culture
and rules.'O° Examples of IPTF observers stopping or interfering with
local court proceedings alleging an unfair trial were frequent. In many
cases the IPTF observers simply had no knowledge of how court proce-
dure in a civil law system operated. Their assumption was that because
it looked "different" it had to be unfair. It is these kinds of enforcement
problems that can create enormous obstacles to genuine cooperation and
assistance. External legal actors must avoid imbuing their contact com-
munity with a sense of their own cultural and legal superiority.
Rebuilding must incorporate a genuine appreciation for the validity of
the local legal culture and not an attempt to override it with a foreign
import.
c. Rebuilding Local Police Forces
Building confidence in the local police is a crucial component of re-
construction. The role of the IPTF is cuspidate in monitoring the work
of local police forces. IPTF has the major task of screening and training
local forces. This task is a delicate one, given the link that has emerged
between political affiliation and the capacity to gain state employment
in areas that are dominated by nationalist politics which actively disfa-
vor minorities. Generally, local police forces are composed of
members from the dominant ethnicity of the region. From the outset,
109. Interview on file with author. (The author conducted a number of interviews while
serving as the Special Representative of the Prosecutor of the ICTY. These interviews were
granted on the condition of complete anonymity.)
110. Human Rights Watch has documented patterns of employment discrimination
against individuals based on their political affiliation or ethnic identity. See HUMAN RiGHTS
WATCH, POLITICS OF REVENGE, THE MIsusE OF AUTHORrrY IN BIHAC, CAZIN, AND VELIKA
KLADUSA 16-22 (1997). One of their reported interviews articulates the experienced dis-
crimination as follows:
I've never been a soldier. I worked in the school during the whole war... I was
fired because of being on the side of the aggressor. I never got it in writing. There
were nine of us who were teachers before and don't teach now, none have jobs .. I
was director of the school for nine years ... as soon as they heard that my son left
the Fifth Corps to join the 'autonomy' (autonomous movement) they fired me.
They turned my office into a mosque.
Id at 18.
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their unrepresentativeness is a burden in ethnically mixed communities.
This factor is exacerbated by the persistent allegations of human rights
abuses by local police forces."' With this lack of confidence in the en-
forcers of law the role of the international overseer is vital. The IPTF is
mandated to screen individuals joining the local police forces. The IPFT
spokesperson has stated that:
These reports [of human rights abuses] will be independently
investigated and the IPTF will demand disciplinary action to be
taken against those found guilty of human rights abuses. The
IPTF will not hesitate to publish the names of the officers in-
volved and will ensure that they no longer serve as policemen."'
Despite these verbal commitments, difficulties persist. Vetting po-
lice officers has been a cumbersome and slow process which has
inevitably meant that abuses continue and that the objective of police
impartiality is threatened. The vetting process is further encumbered by
the additional need to reduce the numbers of policemen serving in the
jurisdiction."' The IPFT has been slow in practice to publish the names
of officers proven to have engaged in abuses of power." 4 Further, despite
commitments to ethical and human rights training for police officers by
the IPTF, such training has been slow to materialize on the ground.
The IPTF must also be seen to be accessible to the ordinary citizen.
Creating easy procedures for ordinary persons to submit information
about police chiefs or officers that might render them unfit for their po-
sitions, including information about involvement in war crimes, would
greatly assist the IPFT's own work and its currency with local popula-
tions. Another crucial goal for the IPTF mission is that of transparency.
It should be transparent in its oversight functions and demonstrate to the
local political and legal communities how it undertakes its work. The
IPTF could further this, for example, by publishing information about
its processes of supervising the vetting and restructuring of the Federa-
tion police.
As with many other international organizations operating in Bosnia,
the IPTF faces a dual task. On the one hand, the IPTF's function is to
help rebuild and restructure a particular component of the society in
I11. Id. at 31-37. See also ongoing human rights abuses by police forces are docu-
mented by Simor, supra note 93, at 660, with specific reference to Mostar.
112. POLITICS OF REVENGE, supra note 110, at 40.
113. There are currently approximately 20,000 policemen serving in the Bosnian-Croat
Federation, and about 12,000 in the Republika Srpska. See No Justice No Peace, supra note
108, at 9.
114. Id. at9.
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which it is placed. The importance of rehabilitating the police is under-
lined by the reminder that it is local police who will be the standard
bearers for law and order, after the departure of international forces.
They are the foundations upon which a rule of law state will be built. On
the other hand, the IPTF must remain attuned to the dangers of facili-
tating indefinite dependency by taking over extensive powers of the
local police forces. The object of international oversight is not to cripple
domestic civilian capacity but to encourage it to flourish.
5. The Proliferation of External Organizations
Finally, a self-evident observation is that there are a myriad of inter-
national organizations in Bosnia. They include the Human Rights
Commission created under Dayton, the Office of the High Representa-
tive (OHR), the U.N. International Police Force (IPTF), U.N. Civil
Affairs, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the European
Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), and the International Com-
mittee for the Red Cross (ICRC) to mention only the institutional actors.
Many of these have overlapping mandates. As one commentator has
pointed out: "Through the end of 1996, senior officials at most major
implementing agencies described a chaotic blend of different mandates,
incompatible timetables, and divided leadership among their respective
executive bodies." 115
Ensuring that there is no duplication of efforts requires constant co-
operation and information sharing among these organizations. In
addition, such a vast array of external institutional power and structure
can be overwhelming for the domestic system upon which it is imposed.
It is important that the international community, in its genuine and
commendable efforts to assist rebuilding the fragile Bosnian state, also
acknowledge that it must not create a crippled state that merely func-
tions indefinitely on the crutches of the international community. This is
in the interests of neither Bosnia nor the guarantor states.
Doubtlessly, the competing and myriad agendas of the international
organizations were skillfully manipulated by the Bosnian parties who
used such divisions to further their own political ends. The international
intervention in Bosnia was marked by a decentralized peace implemen-
tation, splintered into multiple supra-national mandates. Also
problematic is the profound ambivalence which exists among the local
international actors about the shape of post-war Bosnia. This creates
115. See Cousens, supra note 90, at 815.
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competing dynamics both on the ground and in thinking about long term
strategies of rehabilitation for the jurisdiction. Most forcefully it intensi-
fies uncertainty, which benefits those who wish to foreclose the capacity
of a multiethnic democracy to be born in the wake of ethnic conflict.
The lesson to be learned here is that international efforts need to be in-
ternally unified and organizationally coherent." 6
F. Domestic and International Complimentarily,
The International War Crimes Tribunal
and the Domestic Legal System
An obvious bi-polar legal relationships exists between the Bosnian
legal system and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The relationship is a fragile one.
One the one hand, the relationship is premised on the notion that the
Tribunal's function is to support the ability of the domestic jurisdiction
to account for war crimes committed on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia (the principle of complementarity)." ' On the other hand, it is
a relationship of subordination. The ICTY has the right to require defer-
ral of competence meaning that a war crimes proceeding can be
transferred by request, from the domestic to the international level of
accountability. This deferral can occur either before or during the inves-
tigation of crimes within the competence of the Tribunal at the domestic
level."" In creating the ICTY the international community was not, it
must be stressed, taking over the entire responsibility of prosecuting all
persons who may have been responsible for committing crimes in the
116. See id.
117. Complementarity is a vague principle. On the one hand, it incorporates a notion of
equality, in that it presupposes that some domestic proceedings will take place. On the other,
the kinds of cases in which complementarity arises, presume that the domestic court is either
unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction over the violations in question. See generally
Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling The Jurisdiction of National
Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383 (1998).
118. Under Rule 9 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the ICTY may
request deferral to its competence while criminal proceedings are being conducted before
national courts on the following grounds:
1) if the act being investigated or that which is the subject of the proceedings
characterized as an ordinary crime.
2) if there is a lack of impartiality or independence or the investigations or
proceedings are designed to shield the accused from international crimi-
nal responsibility or the case is not diligently prosecuted; or
3) when what is in issue is closely related to or otherwise involves signifi-
cant factual or legal questions that may have implications for
investigations or prosecutions before the International Tribunal.
[Vol. 19:957
The Dayton Peace Agreement
former Yugoslavia. The ICTY is premised on a two-tier system of war
crimes prosecution. In such a system, primary responsibility for war
crimes prosecution lies with the national courts." 9 The international ad
hoc tribunal steps in where the scope of the crime (or the alleged perpe-
trator) warrants international prosecution, where national trials may not
be carried out, or where substantive/procedural irregularities need to be
corrected.
It is important that the international community and an already
overburdened Tribunal assist and facilitate the capacity of the domestic
legal system to process war crimes trials.20 It stands to reason that the
ICTY will (at best) process only a fraction of those suspected of having
committed war crimes. This is both a matter of finance and practicality.
In the ideal world, national courts are in the best position to process war
crimes; they are located in the territory, they apply law that the perpe-
trators cannot claim to be ignorant of, and they can apprehend suspects
more easily. Equally important are the psychological consequences of
facilitating national courts in this endeavor. They demonstrate the will-
ingness to be active rather than passive in the face of massive violations
of human rights, fair and open trials can allow for confidence building
the idea of the rule of law itself, and they are the first step in meaningful
institutional building within the legal system.
1. Rebuilding the Bosnian Legal System
However, for institution building to occur some very practical
measures must be put in place. What is most immediately in need of
redress is the lack of practical resources available to the legal system.
For example, the main courthouse in Sarajevo, which would try a sig-
nificant portion of any domestic trials, was severely damaged during the
war. Similar damage has been caused to many legal buildings in the ter-
ritory of Bosnia. A practical program of re-building damaged facilitate
is a vital component of capacity building. Internal legal resources are
119. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995).
120. Some international scholars have already recognized the need for extensive and
supportive assistance to domestic legal system in post conflict situations. The Draft Guiding
Principles for Combating Impunity for International Crimes sets out one model for such
assistance. It advocates that an International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) be estab-
lished to rehabilitate the judicial systems of states who have suffered violent conflict. This
body would co-ordinate NGO, government and U.N. efforts to 1) bring war criminals to
justice and 2) rehabilitate the national judicial and legal system. Principle 22 of the Guiding
Principles outlines that the ILAC would provide technical legal assistance to the domestic
state. This would be aimed at the prosecution of alleged war criminals and on judicial re-
structuring. See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 21.
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also scarce. Facilities to record oral evidence in Bosnian courtrooms are
grossly inadequate."' At this point, the domestic legal system is only
dealing with a handful of cases. One shudders to think of the practical
obstacles with the potentially huge number of impending cases. The
technical assistance required by the courts and their staff is glaringly
absent.' Current writing on democracy-building notes that judicial and
legal reform play a crucial part in democracy assistance and the prioriti-
zation of aid.'23 This has not yet been the case in Bosnia. In part, this can
be explained by the emphasis placed on making sufficient financial re-
sources available to the international tribunal, while the domestic legal
system lags behind in priority and visibility. While this is a matter of
prioritizing resource allocation, there is also a need to recognize that
technical support for the legal system is not a luxury.2 4
Some practical measures which might assist in re-prioritizing the
legal sphere include convening a steering committee of donors to pro-
mote better coordination among funding programs. Greater international
"transparency" and accountability in the priority setting for technical
assistance would help to establish empirically the basis, upon which
resource allocation is made, and to facilitate reprioritizing. For example,
the World Bank, IMF, and the European Commission should publish
information regularly on their economic assistance packages, including
121. See interviews, supra note 109. An old-fashioned manual typewriter is the only
means for recording oral evidence at trial in many courtrooms. Thus, the recording of evi-
dence is difficult, particularly where there was any to-and-fro or dispute over interpretation.
122. Not all prosecutors have a telephone, many do not have computers, and most of
the computers in the prosecutors' offices do not have data-base facilities. The lack of data-
base capacity means that it would be impossible (without long hours of manual labor) to
cross-reference and compile information. Such process is crucial to the cases concerning
command and control responsibility. In addition, my interviews with legal professionals also
revealed that many were paid paltry sums for their occupations. In the "black-market" of
services in a post-war economy, U.N. drivers are paid substantially more than the Bosnian
judges and prosecutors dealing with war crimes and other cases.
123. See Carothers, supra note 24, at 113.
124. In theory, the amount of inward investment to Bosnia-Herzegovina will be mas-
sive. In 1996, under the auspices of the World Bank, a framework for investment was put in
place to jump start the economy of the Federation and that of Republika Srpska. A total of
$1.8 billion was pledged for Bosnia-Herzegovina at two donor conferences in 1996, of which
$1.5 billion was fully committed. Reconstruction contracts worth $1.02 billion had been
signed by the end of 1996, of which $950 million had been spent by the end of that year. See
AID AND AccoUNTABILrrY, supra note 80, at 10. The difficulties of economic rebuilding
should not be underestimated. Stitching together Bosnia's ravaged economy has proven an
arduous task. "You spend half of your time getting each of the three electric companies to
recognize the other two" said Zsuzasana Hargitai of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. "We have been negotiating mini 'Daytons' all over the place". Bosnia's
Continued Squabbling Blocks Reconstruction, INT'L HERALD & TRIB., Dec. 11, 1997, at
A13.
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criteria for starting or ending projects. More particularly, the resource
needs of the legal system in Bosnia need to be made visible to the inter-
national donor community. The allocation of resources is a vital
component of rebuilding faith in civilian structures and the rule of law.
Adequate resources are a means to ensure that the rule of law can be
delivered to the citizens it is intended to serve.
Resource allocation is a crucial issue with respect to the legal mate-
rials and training available to judges and lawyers. Domestic war crimes
are proceeded with under Article 142 of the Criminal Code of the
SFRY.'5 This provision had never been litigated domestically. There is
little guidance on its scope and interpretation. The domestic interpreta-
tive process can only go to international jurisprudence and writing for
clarification. Access to international material was and remains limited
for many local legal actors. 26 Many domestic judges are cognizant of
the fact that they are making "new" law. 27 There can be no doubt that
greater liaison with the ICTY, training programs and technical assis-
tance would make this task much easier for both judges and lawyers. If
the domestic system fails to apply the international standards correctly
they will, no doubt, be roundly criticized. By failing to give the system
the information needed to do what the international community expects,
we set up the domestic legal system to fail at its task, through no abso-
lute fault of its own. In rebuilding the domestic legal system the war
crimes trials will be viewed as the testing ground. For the domestic sys-
tem to traverse the chasm successfully, the knowledge gap needs to be
filled.
At worst, a lack of resources might be prejudicial to open, fair and
competent judicial procedures. The number of war-crimes cases will
increase domestically, thus increasing the resource strain. The Bosnian
legal system will be closely watched (evident by the number of interna-
tional observers present at any domestic war crimes trials) by the
international world. The Bosnian Federation has demonstrated genuine
good-will to conduct these trials openly, fairly, and competently. How-
ever, assistance, which is currently lacking, is sorely needed to do so.
There are specific problems posed by the Republika Srpska's atti-
tude towards the processing of domestic war crimes trials. In short,
concerns pervade about the willingness of the Republika Srpska to be
125. This corresponds to Art. 120 of the Basic Criminal Code of Croatia. See generally
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, in
THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL NATIONAL COURTS AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION (1995).
126. See interviews, supra note 109.
127. Id.
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equally willing to undertake genuine and fair accountability within its
"entity" boundaries. Specific problems encountered there include inade-
quate monitoring of due process violations, including access to counsel
during the investigation stage of criminal proceedings. In addition, fol-
lowing the Dayton signing an early practice emerged in Republika
Srpska of arresting ethnic minorities on what appeared to be weak
grounds for political considerations.2 Given the overall lack of coop-
eration by the Republika Srpska with the Dayton process, law has been
one among many causalities of an unwillingness to support account-
ability and transparency in the jurisdiction. Effective legality in the
Republika Srpska poses a threat to the hegemony of political forces who
were the principal actors in the war project. Reestablishing the primacy
of law is one of the most effective means to channel international re-
sources to those constituencies within the Republic committed to
resuming safe and normal lives.
G. The Rules of the Road Agreement
An important component of the bi-lateral relationship between the
International Tribunal and the domestic legal system is the Rules of the
Road agreement.' Rules of the Road was an understanding hastily con-
cluded by the guarantor states and the successor states following the
Dayton Agreement in February 1996.130 It arose from the specter that
indicted war criminals could be picked up by chance, particularly those
viewed as instrumental to the success of the Dayton Agreement, thereby
endangering the peace process. Rules of the Road sought to put the
brakes on zealous arresting by local police forces. It established that in
order for any domestic arrest or prosecution to proceed in the successor
states, the International Tribunal would first have "signed off' on the
relevant legal papers."' In practice, this meant that local police forces
128. See interviews, supra note 109.
129. See PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR PARTIES FOR THE SUBMISSION OF CASES
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA UNDER THE
AGREED MEASURES OF FEB. 18, 1996 [hereinafter RULES OF THE ROAD] (on file with
author).
130. Rules of the Road was signed by President Tudjman of Croatia, President Mi-
losevic of Serbia and President Izetbegovic of Bosnia in Rome on February 18, 1996.
131. The General Introduction to the Agreement sets out the following:
Persons other than those already indicted by the International Tribunal, may be ar-
rested and detained for serious violations of international humanitarian law only
pursuant to a previously issued order, warrant, or indictment that has been re-
viewed and deemed consistent with international legal standards by the
international Tribunal. Procedures will be developed for expeditious decision by
the Tribunal and will be effective immediately upon such action.
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would have to send all information and evidence that they had available
to them concerning suspicions that an individual had committed war
crimes to the Hague for review.' Arrest of an individual could only oc-
cur where the International Tribunal indicated in writing to the local
authorities that there existed sufficient evidence to provide a basis for
proceeding further.'
Rules of the Road created a multitude of problems. The speed of the
pact meant that there was little time for consultation with the Interna-
tional Tribunal or with local legal authorities about how it would
actually work in practice. The burden placed on the International Tribu-
nal was considerable. The Tribunal had an additional working priority
added to its mandate without additional resources or personnel to fa-
cilitate the task directly. The short-term result was a paper log-jam at the
Tribunal, which did not have the resources to spend on a flood of do-
mestic case briefs.
Rules of the Road also created a number of problems for the do-
mestic legal system. The aim of preventing ethnically motivated arrests
was a genuine and positive one. After the signing of the Dayton Agree-
ment the authorities in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Republika Srpska had started publicizing lists of persons whom they
considered to be responsible for war crimes."M Many of these compila-
tions were based on questionable evidence and were also a mechanism
to intimidate, discouraging refugees from returning to their homes
which were under the control of another ethnic group. 3' Charging per-
sons with war crimes was an effective means to intimidate and harass
former enemies as well as a means to prevent full ethnic re-integration,
which would be held hostage to politically motivated misuse of war
crimes trials.
Acknowledging this, it is nonetheless important to chart the negative
effects that Rules of the Road has had upon the domestic legal system.
Undeniably, the rule of law in Bosnia was in tatters at the end of the
war. The legal system was fragile and in need of substantial rebuilding.
Unfortunately, the immediate effect of the Rules of the Road has been to
entirely over-ride the domestic legal structure in the area of war crimes.
RULES OF THE ROAD, supra note 129.
132. Article 5 of the Rules of the Road Agreement sets out that the request for review
had to be accompanied by a case file containing the following information: a copy of the
document to be reviewed; a summary of the personal history of the individual alleged to have
committed crimes; a summary of the procedural steps already taken in the case; a summary
of the circumstances of the crime; and a summary of the available evidence. See id.
133. See id., Art. 7.
134. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLITICS OF REVENGE, supra note 110, at 31.
135. See id.
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The following flaws emerge with the approach. Under Rules of the Road
evidence gathering and case presentation is undertaken by the MUP
(local police). Thus, it is the local police who gather evidence under
Rules of the Road and present the case to the International Tribunal. To
the common law observer this is not an unusual nor problematic divi-
sion of labor. In most common law systems is the police who have the
primary role in relation to the charging and collating of evidence in
criminal proceedings. This is not the case in the civil law system. In-
stead, in the civil law structure the police play a secondary role to that of
the investigating magistrate, who conducts investigations and directs
evidence gathering. Under Rules of the Road there is no role carved out
for the investigating magistrate, a pivotal figure in the civil law system
in the establishment of evidence and prime facie case for criminal pro-
ceedings. Rules of the Road imposed a version of the common law
system of evidence gathering on a civil law system, without replacing
the safeguards that existed in the civil law structure. The over-ride was
taken, without consultation with domestic judges and prosecutors, cre-
ating feelings of impotency and marginalization' 36 As a result, the Rules
of the Road are a source of unanimous resentment by the local judiciary
and prosecutorial services. '37 Many felt that they were being by-passed
by external agreement, and that no consideration had been given to the
integrity of their own legal culture in the process. International success
in rebuilding an integrated and multiethnic Bosnia will also be measured
by the successful rehabilitation of the rule of law in the jurisdiction.
Maintaining the cooperation and goodwill of local legal actors is not
ancillary to this project but innately linked to it. Thus, the resentment
created by Rules of the Road is important to address, as it remains likely
to be a feature of the Bosnian legal landscape in the short-term.
While the need for preventing politically motivated arrests was evi-
dent immediately following the Dayton Agreement, there was also a
balancing necessity to rebuild confidence in the rule of law in Bosnia.
Where external international actors compliment or replace local legal
systems in times of crisis there is a need for sensitivity and long-term
thinking. The sensitivity is located in the obligation to take account of
local legal culture in the imposition of internal structures. The long-term
view needs to take account of the potential of the local legal system to
be regenerated and for its integrity to be protected in the transition pe-
riod. Rules of the Road is lacking on both counts.
136. See interviews, supra note 109.
137. See id.
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One practical result of implementing the Rules was a paucity in ar-
resting suspects. This created a real possibility that those under
investigation would flee as the papers awaiting a "signing off" are proc-
essed. To ensure the efficacy of the system created by the Rules of the
Road, the International Tribunal needs structural and financial resources
specifically directed toward processing reports. Equally, there are a
number of other issues about the workings of the Rules of the Road
Agreement which merit a revisit. It is now apparent that the Rules of the
Road agreement has also failed to prevent local police authorities from
abusing the power of arrest to intimidate, harass and coerce political
opponents from differing ethnic groups. Human Rights Watch have re-
ported widespread instances in some localities involving flagrant
violations of the Rules of the Road Agreement."' These abuses are
partly related to the inadequate monitoring and selection of police
forces, thereby failing to identify and dismiss officers who may have
formerly or are currently engaged in violating the rights of citizens and
suspects. But further, as Rules of the Road does not institutionalize the
civil law mechanism of supervision for police by giving a role to the
investigating magistrate, the work of the police in this arena is com-
pletely lacking domestic supervision. If the International Tribunal
continues to have a direct long-term role in Bosnian war crimes trials, it
is imperative that the structure of that involvement be re-configured to
give adequate and necessary recognition to the value of the civil law
structures of control over the investigations conducted by local police
forces.
H. The Link between Local and
International Accountability
Ultimately rebuilding legal capacity aims to make the enforcement
of law meaningful to citizens. Building confidence in the rule of law in
138. Human Rights Watch have noted in their report on three municipalities (Bihac,
Cazin, and Valika Kladusa) that there are ongoing and unredressed violations of the Agree-
ment. The Report states:
In direct violation of the principles of the Rome Agreement, the Una Sana canto-
nal authorities arrested and detained twelve individuals within the past two years
on charges of war crimes without prior authorization from the ICTY. Once ar-
rested, the cantonal authorities failed to forward the files on these individuals to
the ICTY, in some cases for as long as nine months after arrest and imprisonment.
Though some of those detained have been in prison in Bihac since before February
1996, none of the files were submitted to the ICTY until December 1996, ten
months after the signing of the Rome Agreement.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLrTICS OF REVENGE, supra note 110, at 32.
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Bosnia has many components. Not least of these is the obvious starting
point that accountability for past crimes is an immeasurable component
of any forward progress. The legal obligations of the state parties and
the guarantor states in this respect is not subject to any ambiguity. The
U.N. Security Council had stated that:
... compliance with the requests and orders of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [to arrest and sur-
render to the Tribunal people indicted for war crimes]
constitutes an essential aspect of implementing the Peace
Agreement."'
This obligation also follows from the Genocide Convention, the Ge-
neva Conventions of August 12, 1949, its Additional Protocol 1, and
Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993. This has clearly not
been the case. The small numbers of those indicted for war crimes who
are currently being held at the Hague attest to the lack of international
will to make these commitments meaningful.' 4° This is not a new com-
ment. What must be realized, however, is the extent to which
international inaction in this sphere has profound long-term effects
within Bosnia for confidence in legal process domestically. There is a
bi-partisan relationship between meaningful accountability on the inter-
national plane and its effects on the appreciation for the rule of law in
the local setting. Embedding the rule of law in Bosnia is not a free-
standing enterprise, it is a precarious balancing act with a mammoth
international dimension. That international component must remain
consistently self-aware, attuned not only to its own demands but to the
breathing of the system it supports.
CONCLUSIONS
Whatever our views on the pre-existing legal and political order in
the former Yugoslavia, some aspects of its legal structure should remain
to the fore as the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina is undertaken.
First, Yugoslav space, (in the literal and physical sense) comprised a
multinational environment. Through the mechanism of constitutional
rights, multiple and incompatible claims on the territory and identity of
its many nations were accommodated, partly or significantly (dependent
139. U.N. SCOR, Res. 1022 (1995).
140. As of August 1, 1998, twenty-seven persons are in custody, one is provisionally
released on health grounds, and thirty-one persons who have been publicly indicted are still
at liberty.
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on one's views), through a layered rights discourse of complicated con-
stitutional arrangements. 4' Bosnia must also accommodate multiple and
incompatible claims of territory and identity. Its choice is threefold;
first, separation of the internal political entities (unidimensional statelets
within the state); second, long-term international cuckolding; or third,
the precarious route of accommodation and intersection. In this context,
to dismiss entirely the relevance of the forerunning state entity may be
to discard potential solutions to a problem that is not new to the physical
territory of the Balkans.
At this historical moment, the idea of a Bosnian state has little in-
ternal cohesion. Three statelets bundled into co-existence have mutually
exclusionary ideas about what being a part of the state called Bosnia
means. The territory of the Serb Republic still clings to secessionist
principles, aggravated by ideological nationalism that fluctuates be-
tween rejection and conciliation to the Dayton Agreement. The Croat-
Bosnia Federation is a fragile detente with grave disjunctions between
two political leaderships as to the conception of their mutual co-
existence. As Hansen points out, "Whereas Croats regard it as a federa-
tion of two political administrative units and emphasize the importance
of links to Croatia, Bosnians see their partnership as a community of
two constituent peoples, who underline the integrity of Bosnia, as es-
sential." 14
Out of these mutually exclusionary visions of the state there seems
little room for maneuver or compromise. Yet, despite all the shortcom-
ings illustrated throughout this work, Dayton itself is testament to the
capacity for finding a middle ground, albeit a narrow one. The real
challenge lies in widening that narrow ledge and with it creating the
means to ensure a functional, not a deformed state. For the short term,
Dayton has provided a home to group identity and has created spaces in
141. It is to be noted that in the Yugoslav constitution, both the republics and the con-
stituent nations bore national rights. Under the Yugoslav constitution, Bosnia-Herzegovina
was a republic composed of three political (constituent) nations, none of whom were a ma-
jority. One of the products of the Yugoslav disintegration was the terminology of "minority"
as opposed to "nation" was seen to be particularly inadequate for the protection of the rights
of the republics and the groups that composed them. This was obviously acute in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. For example, as Susan Woodward points out,
They [European Community politicians] referred instead to the need to guarantee
minority rights, as if these assurances would be a positive cause of conflict in
Croatia ( and eventually Bosnia-Herzegovina) - the demotion of other constituent
nations to minority status in the 1990 republican constitution and therefore their
loss of political equality and of a right to self-determination.
WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 210.
142. Hansen, supra note 32, at 82.
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which some (though not all) people may feel secure to rebuild. It bears
reminding that the homes and spaces provided by group identity can be
suffocating. 43 Rebuilding Bosnia in a meaningful way requires modali-
ties of transition from the starting point of a settlement premised on the
cohesion of the group, to a society that nurtures the individual and cele-
brates its multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, and diversity. Legal
structures are one bridge for this passage. The rigidity of the Dayton
agreements could leave one pessimistic on its capacity to encourage this
kind of societal transformation. Thus, much depends on the encourage-
ment of the international community to view Dayton as a means to a
much more inclusive end, rather than the end itself.
143. See generally MIROSLAV VOLF, EXCLUSION AND EMBRACE: A THEOLOGICAL
EXPLORATION OF IDENTITY, OTHERNESS, AND RECONCILIATION (1996).
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